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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Faced with budgetary constraints, and increased public scorn as a result of the 
ballooning budget deficit, the federal government has begun to reinvent itself by adopting 
more stringent fiscal policies.  As a supplement to existing policies, an industry analysis 
will be conducted of the firms that the federal government currently has relationships 
with, in an effort to determine whether best business practices are being applied by those 
entities. 
 
B. PURPOSE  
The Defense Sector and Homeland Security Industry are currently experiencing a 
period of rapid consolidation.  Very Large, defense focused conglomerates are being 
formed, increasing the bargaining position of the few firms that remain in the market.  As 
the single customer for many products of the defense industry, DoD must have the ability 
to identify and address potential harmful effects of mergers and acquisitions.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine whether consolidation activity within the defense 
sector yields positive net benefits for shareholders, and more importantly its effect on 
taxpayers.  
This thesis researches and investigates the business case for defense sector 
consolidation, as it pertains to the corporations involved in consolidation activity, and the 
DoD, acting in its capacity as guardian of the public trust. 
 
C. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis will assess the effectiveness of merger and acquisition activity within 
the Defense Sector.  As a result of the data and subsequent analysis contained within this 
report, both decision makers within the DoD and shareholders will obtain a better level of 
understanding with regard to the benefits and downfalls of Defense Sector consolidation. 
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D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to gain insight as to the effectiveness of 
defense sector consolidation, and its bearing on taxpayers and shareholders. 
1. Second Order Objectives 
a. Determine whether an income transfer from taxpayers to 
shareholders is taking place as a result of defense sector consolidation. 
b. Determine whether defense sector mergers are leading to 
economies of scale and scope. 
c. Determine whether conglomerates within the defense sector are 
experiencing size efficiencies. 
d.   Provide an answer to the following question: If synergies do not 




The research centers around the financial performance and overall effectiveness 
of the following eight U.S. Defense firms: Lockheed Martin (LMT), Boeing Co (BA), 
General Dynamics (GD), Goodrich Corp (GR), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon Co 
(RTN), L-3 Communications Holdings (LLL), and Alliant Techsystems (ATK).  Each 
firm’s balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows will be examined, in 
order to gauge each corporations operating performance.  A model will also be developed 
utilizing each firm’s monthly stock price over the past 15 years, as a means by which to 
ascertain the capital gains returned to shareholders over that period.  An examination of 
various GAO reports on the cost savings to the government as a direct result of defense 
contractor restructuring will be conducted. 
This thesis will include an outline of the guidance contained within the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s jointly issued “1992 





F. METHODOLOGY  
The information utilized in the development of this thesis was obtained through a 
thorough analysis of current literature and periodicals, journal articles, technical reports, 
organizational experiences with regard to defense contractor restructuring, as well as 
online financial references.  This research uses the following data sources: a 
comprehensive review of the merger and acquisition guidance within the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, an examination of past analysis contained 
within GAO reports, and a review of Thomson Financial’s Merger and Acquisition 
database 
 
G. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: Will consolidation within the defense sector 
improve the financial performance of defense contractors while simultaneously yielding 
cost savings to taxpayers?  The secondary research questions are as follows: 
1. Why are firms interested in mergers and acquisitions? 
2. What precipitated the need for defense sector consolidation? 
3. Have the firms engaged in the merger and acquisition activity increased 
their profitability? 
4. Have capital gains improved as a result of merger and acquisition activity? 
5. Have the acquiring and merged firms outperformed the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index? 
6. Has competition suffered as a result of defense sector consolidation? 
7. Has the government, and more importantly taxpayers benefited as a result 
of defense sector consolidation? 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
¾ Chapter I. Introduction 
¾ Chapter II. Provides a synopsis of the Cold War, specifically, the 
events of the world that provided the catalyst for the Cold War, the 
significant events of the Cold War, and the conclusion of the Cold War. 
¾ Chapter III. The fundamental reasons for mergers and acquisitions 
between firms, and a look at defense sector consolidation and its effects.  
Stakeholder analysis of the defense industry will be conducted. 
¾ Chapter IV. Regulations governing mergers and acquisitions:  An 
examination of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. 
¾ Chapter V. Explains operating performance and capital gains results as 
a result of merger and acquisition activity.  Examines the effects of 
defense sector consolidation on taxpayers.  This chapter also provides an 
analysis of the financial data pertaining to each defense firm. 
¾ Chapter VI. Draws conclusions based on the analysis and provides 
recommendations on methods by which defense sector consolidation can 
become more beneficial for each stakeholder.  This chapter also presents 
areas for further research. 
 
I. RESEARCH APPLICATION 
The intended primary beneficiaries of this thesis are Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition community decision makers, and corporations looking to engage in 
defense related merger and acquisition activity.  The lessons learned from this research 
may be incorporated into merger and acquisition feasibility studies on the part of both the 
DoD and private and public firms looking to engage in either mergers or acquisitions.  
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II. THE COLD WAR REVISITED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The rash of merger and acquisition activity that has taken place within the defense 
sector is a by-product of the policy changes adopted after the sudden conclusion of the 
Cold War.  The Cold War can best be described as a 42-year military campaign, pitting 
competing ideologies, capitalism1 (United States) against communism2 (Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics), whereby the two world powers, and major participants, the United 
States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) looked to “spend” one 
another into oblivion.  For firms engaged in the business of national defense, this was a 
glorious time, and the most profitable of years.   
When the end of the Cold War necessitated that a reduction in defense spending 
take place, many firms within the defense industry suddenly found themselves carrying 
excess capacity, and operating inefficiently.  A major industry-wide reorganization was 
needed in order to increase operational efficiencies and ultimately profits.  In this case, 
competitiveness can only be restored through downsizing and consolidation.  This 
chapter will detail and outline the significant events and milestones of the Cold War, and 
its effect on the defense industry. 
 
B. A RACE FOR ARMS 
What would come to be known as the “Cold War,” actually found its beginnings 
in a National Security Council document known as NSC-683.  With the “loss” of China 
                                                 
1 An economic system in which all or most of the means of production are privately owned and 
operated, and the investment of capital and the production, distribution and prices of commodities (goods 
and services) are determined mainly in a free market, rather that by the state. (www.wikipedia.com) 
(08/04/05) 
2 A theoretical system of social organization and a political movement based on common ownership of 
the means of production.  As a political movement, communism seeks to establish a classless society. 
(www.wikipedia.com) (08/04/05) 
3 NSC-68 was a classified report written by Paul Nitze and issued by the United States Security 
Council on 14 April 1950, during the presidency of Harry Truman.  The report outlined the National 
Security Strategy of the United States for that time and provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and 
psychological. (www.wikipedia.com) (08/04/05) 
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coinciding with the explosion of the Soviet atom bomb4, the U.S. was now forced to take 
drastic measures.  At the end of January 1950, President Truman ordered the expeditious 
development of the hydrogen bomb.  He also called for an overview of America’s foreign 
and defense policies.  The result of the review was a secret National Security Council 
document known as NSC-68.  NSC-68 noted that the American atomic monopoly had 
been broken, and argued that Soviet strength would have to be met by conventional 
means.  NSC-68 concluded by calling for a massive increase of expenditure on 
conventional arms, from $13 billion to $50 billion.  A race for arms had begun. 
Listed below in chronological order are the significant events of the Cold War, 
which followed NSC-68 (Adapted from “COLD WAR”):  
¾ On 1 November 1952, the U.S. completes a successful test of the Hydrogen 
bomb (H-Bomb); 
¾ Nine months later on August 12, 1953, the Soviet Union successfully tested 
their own version of the H-Bomb; 
¾ In December of 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a speech at 
the United Nations, which centered on the notion that “competition be 
replaced with international cooperation on atomic energy.”  This proposal 
came to be known as Atoms for Peace; 
¾ In 1955, President Eisenhower warned, “The problem in defense spending is 
to figure how far you should go without destroying from within what you are 
trying to defend from without.” 
¾ On 5 October 1957, at 0128, the Soviet launched Sputnik satellite orbits the 
earth. The U.S. now found itself behind in the crucial race for space 
dominance; 
                                                 
The report argued that the Soviet Union had a systematic strategy aimed at the spread of Communism 
across the entire world, and it recommended that the U.S. government adopt a policy of containment to stop 
the further spread of communism.  NSC-68 outlined a drastic foreign policy shift from defensive to active 
containment and advocated aggressive military preparedness. (www.wikipedia.com) (08/04/05) 
4 The USSR successfully tested an atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, at 0700. (COLD WAR 145) 
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¾ During 1958, the pressure on President Eisenhower forced him, against his 
better judgment, to increase defense spending.  In a revised budget for 1959, 
he enlarged spending on the military to well over half the federal budget, at 
more than $40 billion; 
¾ Throughout 1959, the development of the next generation of missiles, the 
submarine fired Polaris, the Thor, and the Minuteman, pushed defense 
spending even higher.  President Eisenhower was furious, and expressed the 
need to avoid “hysteria and demagoguery,” and instead “exert some 
reasonable control” over defense spending; 
¾ On 12 April 1961 the Russians celebrated their finest triumph when they 
launched the first man into outer space.  The Cold War was just sent into the 
heavens; 
¾ In October 1964, China completed a successful test of an atomic bomb.  The 
nuclear threat to the U.S. increased by 100%.   
o Less than three years later, the Chinese developed and tested a 
hydrogen bomb; 
¾ President Ronald Reagan’s Committee on Present Danger, which was strongly 
anti-communist, made a recommendation to the President to significantly 
increase defense expenditures upon taking office; 
o Within two weeks of taking office, President Reagan increased the 
defense budget by $32.6 billion. 
o Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, announced that his mission 
was to “rearm America”; 
o The Pentagon received almost everything that it requested, including 
the B-1 bomber, which President Jimmy Carter had scrapped, an 
enlarged Navy, and reinforcements of conventional weaponry; 
o Through the decade the national debt would soar from $1 trillion to $4 
trillion; 
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¾ President Reagan reasoned that the United States could afford the cost of a 
new escalation in the arms race, but the Soviets could not. 
 
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
The following bullets chronicle the events leading to the conclusion of the Cold 
War: 
¾ At the end of March 1989, the Soviet Union held its first largely free elections 
in seventy-five years; 
¾ On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall came crumbling down.  This event 
symbolized the end of communism in Europe; 
¾ On 2 December 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed, “We don’t consider 
you (U.S.) as an enemy anymore.  Things have changed.” 
o This was the determining sentence that ended an era. 
¾ On 12 June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected to the newly created post of 
President of Russia. 
o  Yeltsin received 57 percent of 80 million votes; 
o Yeltsin was the first democratically elected leader in Russian history. 
¾ On 31 July, 1991, at a summit in Moscow, President George H. W. Bush and 
Mikhail Gorbachev signed START I5, beginning a new sequence of strategic 
arms reduction agreements; 
¾ On 20 and 21 August 1991, Estonia and Latvia declared for independence 
from Soviet rule, and Lithuania reaffirmed its declaration of 1990; 
                                                 
5 START, officially the STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty, was a nuclear weapons limitation treaty 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The treaty was initially proposed by President Ronald 
Reagan.  It was retroactively named START I when the second START treaty, START II began to be 
discussed and later went into effect.  It was signed on 31 July 1991, five months before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  The treaty placed limits on the number of  various types of vehicles and warheads that could 
be deployed by either side.  It remains in effect, as a treaty between the US and Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have since totally disarmed their nuclear 
capability.  (www.wikipedia.com) (08/04/05) 
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o The republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Armenia all followed soon after. 
¾ On 2 September 1991, President Bush announced that the United States 
recognized the independence of the Baltic states; 
¾ The Soviet State Council followed suit on 6 September 1991. 
¾ On 25 December 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
ceased to exist. 
¾ In his 1992 State of the Union address, President Bush claimed 
triumphantly that the United States had “won the Cold War.” 
 
D. THE COST OF THE COLD WAR 
No one will ever definitively know for sure how much social good or social 
change could have taken place, had the world chose to make capital expenditures on 
items other than those pertaining to weapons of mass destruction.  One estimate shows 
that $8 trillion ($8,000,000,000,000) was spent worldwide, on nuclear and other weapons 
between 1945 and 1996. (COLD WAR, 418)  Please review Table 1 for a breakdown of 
what $8 trillion dollars translates into for the common person. 
¾ In the United States, according to government figures, expenditures on 
National Defense, which peaked as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) during the Second World War at nearly 40 percent, ran at over 10 
percent in the 1950’s, 9 percent in the 1960’s, and declined to around 5 
percent in the 1970’s, the years of détente6. 
o Spending rose steeply again, however, in the 1980’s to over 6 
percent of GDP; (Review Figure 1 for defense spending trends 
from 1980 thru 2004.) 
                                                 
 6 Détente is French for relaxation.  It was also the general reduction in the tension between the Soviet 
Union and the United States and a weakening of the Cold War, occurring from the late 1960’s until the start 
of the 1980’s.  More generally, it may be applied to any international situation where previously hostile 
nations not involved in an open war “warm up” to each other and threats de-escalate. 
(www.wikipedia.com) (08/04/05) 
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o In real terms, spending ran at $400 billion annually, in 1996 
dollars, during Korea, Vietnam, and the second half of the 1980’s. 










































Source: Created by author with data collected from Appendix F of The Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015  
Figure 1.   Defense Spending Trend 1980 – 2004  
 
Table 1. What $8 trillion can Buy 
Item  Cost  
Number Purchased for $8 
trillion 
Average U.S. Home7 $     212,000 37,735,849
2005 Honda Civic 4-door sedan  $      19,760 404,858,300
Food needed to feed a family of four8  $        6,283 1,273,277,097
                                                  
7 Median price valid for September 2005, according to the National Association of Realtors. 
8 In 1963-1964, Molly Orshansky of the Social Security Administration developed poverty thresholds.  
Orshansky based her poverty thresholds on the “thrifty food plan,” which was the cheapest of four food 
plans developed by the Department of Agriculture.  Orshansky surmised that families of three or more 
persons spent about one third of their after-tax income on food.  She then multiplied the cost of the USDA 
economy food plan by three to arrive at the minimal yearly income a family would need.  Using 1963 as a 
base year, she calculated that a family of four, two adults and two children would spend $1,033 for food per 
year.  Using her formula based on the 1955 survey, she arrived at $3,100 a year ($1,033 X 3) as a poverty 
threshold for a family of four. (http://www.ocpp.org/poverty/how.htm) (11/20/05) 
According to the 2004 Health and Human Services (HHS) Guidelines, the poverty threshold for a 
family of four is $18,850 (48 Contiguous States and D.C.).  Taking the $18,850 poverty threshold, and 
dividing it by 3, you arrive at a yearly food threshold of $6,283. 
(http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/04poverty.shtml) (11/20/05) 
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III. FUNDAMENTAL REASONS BEHIND MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION ACTIVITY  
A. WHY DO FIRMS ENGAGE IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION 
ACTIVITY? 
The key principle behind mergers9 and acquisitions10 (M&A) is quite basic in that 
companies that engage in M&A do so in an effort to create shareholder value over and 
above that of the sum of the two companies.  The two combined companies are expected 
to carry more value than two separate companies.  Mergers and acquisitions seek to 
obtain synergistic effects.  The following information pertaining to the intricacies of 
mergers and acquisitions has been taken from a tutorial provided by 
www.investopedia.com. 
The likelihood that either a merger or acquisition will take place increases 
significantly when times are tough.  Strong companies will look to buy other companies 
to create a more competitive, cost-efficient firm.  The companies will come together 
hoping to gain a greater market share or maximize efficiency.  Because of these potential 
benefits, target companies will often agree to be purchased when they know they cannot 
survive alone.  In the defense industry, the DoD has encouraged the defense industry to 
consolidate facilities and eliminate excess capacity to remain competitive and financially 
viable.  The expectation from the DoD is that cost savings will result from the 
consolidation activity. 
1. Synergy 
Synergy is the magic force that allows for enhanced cost efficiencies of the new 
business. Synergy takes the form of revenue enhancement and cost savings.  By merging, 
the companies hope to benefit from the following: 
                                                 
9 The combining of two or more companies, generally by offering the stockholders of one company 
securities in the acquiring company in exchange for the surrender of their stock.  Basically, when two 
companies become one.  This decision is usually mutual between both firms.  
(http://www.investopedia.com) (08/04/05) 
10 When one company purchases a majority interest in the acquired.  Acquisitions can either be 
friendly or unfriendly.  Friendly acquisitions occur when the target firm agrees to be acquired, unfriendly 
acquisitions don’t have the same from the target firm. (http://www.investopedia.com) (08/04/05) 
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¾ Staff reductions – Money is saved when staffs and workforces are 
reduced. 
¾ Economies of scale – One large firm placing orders reduces its 
transactions costs relative to small firms.  Larger firms also enjoy greater 
purchasing power—when placing larger orders, companies have a greater 
ability to negotiate price with their suppliers. 
¾ Acquiring new technology – To stay competitive, companies need to stay 
on top of technological developments and their business applications.  By 
buying a smaller company with unique technologies, a large company can 
keep or develop a competitive edge. 
¾ Improved market reach and industry visibility – Companies buy 
companies to reach new markets and grow revenues and earnings.  A 
merger may expand the combined companies’ marketing and distribution, 
giving them new sales opportunities.  A merger can also improve a 
company’s standing in the investment community: bigger firms often have 
an easier time raising capital than smaller ones. 
As this thesis points out later on, achieving synergy is easier said than done—it is 
not realized once two firms merge.  In many instances, one and one add up to equal less 
than two.  There are times whereby synergistic opportunities may exist only in the minds 
of the corporate leaders and dealmakers.  Where there is no value to be created, the CEO 
and investment bankers—who have much to gain from a successful M&A deal—will try 
to build up the image of enhanced value.  The market, however, eventually sees through 
this and penalizes the company by assigning it a discounted share price. 
2. Varieties of Mergers 
There are no one size fit all merger deals or definitions.  Mergers take on many 
different forms and structures.  Listed below are a few of the various types, distinguished 
by the relationship between the two merging firms: 
¾ Horizontal merger: Two companies that are in direct competition in the 
same product lines and markets (i.e. Lockheed Corp. and Martin Marietta) 
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¾ Vertical merger: A customer and company or a supplier and 
company.  Think of a diamond supplier to a manufacturer of rings. 
¾ Market-extension merger: To companies that sell the same products in 
different markets.  Consider Bayliner and Northrop Grumman 
¾ Product-extension merger: Two companies selling different but related 
products in the same markets.  Think of Ferrari purchasing Land Rover as 
an introduction into the sport utility vehicle (SUV) market.  
¾ Conglomeration: Two companies that have no common business 
areas.  Think of a bank purchasing a grocery chain. 
From the perspective of how the merger is financed, there are two types of 
mergers: purchase mergers and consolidation mergers.  Each has certain implications for 
the companies involved, and for investors: 
¾ Purchase Mergers – This type of merger occurs when one company 
purchase another one.  The purchase is made by cash or through the issue 
of some kind of debt instrument, and the sale is taxable.11 
¾ Consolidation Mergers – With this merger, a brand new company is 
formed and both companies are bought and combined under the new 
entity.  The tax terms are the same as those of a purchase merger. 
3. Acquisitions 
Like mergers, acquisitions are actions through which companies seek to obtain 
economies of scale, efficiencies, and enhanced market visibility.  Unlike all mergers, all 
acquisitions involve one firm purchasing another—there is no exchanging of stock or 
consolidating as a new company.  Acquisitions are often congenial, with all parties 
feeling satisfied with the deal.  On the other hand, acquisitions can often times be more 
hostile. 
                                                 
11 Acquiring companies often prefer this type of merger because it can provide them with a tax benefit.  
Acquired assets can be “written-up” to the actual purchase price, and the difference between book value 
and purchase price of the assets can depreciate annually, reducing taxes payable by the acquiring company. 
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In an acquisition, a company can buy another company, with cash, with stock (as 
outright compensation, not as an exchange), or a combination of the two.  Another 
possibility which is common in smaller deals, is for one company to acquire all the assets 
of another company, which means that the acquired firm will have only cash (and debt, if 
they had debt before).   
Regardless of their category or structure, all mergers and acquisitions have one 
common goal: they are all meant to create synergy that makes value of the combined 
companies greater than the sum of the two parts.  The success of a merger or acquisition 
depends on how well this synergy is achieved. 
 
B. HOW DO YOU VALUE AN ACQUISITION CANDIDATE? 
Investors in a company that is aiming to take over another one must determine 
whether the purchase will benefit them.  In order to do so, they must ask themselves how 
much the company being acquired is actually worth.  The most common means by which 
to value a company is to look at comparable companies within a given industry, but 
dealmakers employ a variety of methods and tools when assessing a target company.  A 
few examples are listed below: 
1. Comparative Ratios:  The following are two examples of the many 
comparative metrics by which acquirers may base their offers: 
¾ P/E (price-to-earnings) ratio – With the use of this ratio, an acquirer makes an 
offer as a multiple of the earnings the target company is producing.  Looking 
at the P/E for all the stocks within the same industry group will give the 
acquirer good guidance for what the target’s P/E multiple should be. 
¾ EV/Sales (price-to-sales) ratio – With this ratio, the acquiring company makes 
an offer as a multiple of revenues, again, while being aware of the P/S ratio of 
other companies in the industry. 
2. Replacement Cost:  In a few cases, acquisitions are based on the cost of 
replacing the target company.  Suppose the value of a company is simply the 
sum of all its equipment and staffing costs.  The acquiring company can 
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literally order the target to sell at that price, or it will create a competitor.  
Naturally, it takes a long time to assemble good management, acquire 
property, and get the right equipment.  Creating a method of establishing a 
price certainly wouldn’t make much sense in a service industry where the key 
assets are people and ideas. 
3. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF):  A key valuation tool in M&A, discounted 
cash flow analysis determines a company’s current value according to its 
estimated future cash flows.  Forecasted free cash flows (operating income + 
depreciation + amortization of goodwill – capital expenditures – cash taxes – 
change in working capital), discounted to a present value using the company’s 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
Synergy:  The Premium for Potential Success 
For the most part, acquirers nearly always pay a substantial premium on the stock 
market value of the company they acquire.  The justification for doing so nearly always 
boils down to the notion of synergy: a merger benefits shareholders when a company’s 
post-merger share price increases by the value of potential synergy.  It stands to reason 
that it would be highly unlikely for rational owners to sell if they would benefit more by 
not selling.  For sellers, that premium represents their company’s future prospects.  For 
buyers, the premium represents the post-merger synergy they expect can be achieved.  
The following equation solves for the minimum required synergy: 
Pre-Merger Value of Both Firms + Synergy
Post-Merger Number of Shares 
= Pre-Merger Stock Price 
The success of a merger is measured by whether the value of the buyer is 
enhanced by the action.  However, the practical constraints of a merger often prevent the 
expected benefit from being fully achieved. 
What to Look For 
To find merger that have a chance of success, investors should start by look for 
the following criteria: 
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• A reasonable purchase price – A premium of 10% can be considered 
reasonable, whereas a premium of 50% requires synergy of stellar proportions 
for the deal to make sense. 
• Cash transactions – Companies that pay in cash tend to be more careful when 
calculating bids, and valuations come closer to target.  When stock is used as 
the currency for acquisition, discipline can go by the wayside. 
• Sensible appetite – An acquirer should target a company that is smaller and in 
businesses that the acquirer knows intimately.  Synergy is hard to create from 
companies in disparate business areas. 
 
C.   DOING THE DEAL 
1.   The Acquirer’s Offer 
When a CEO and top managers of a company decided they want to execute a 
merger or acquisition, they start with a tender offer12.  The process begins with the 
acquiring company carefully and discreetly buying shares in the target company, and 
building a position.  Once the acquiring company starts to purchase shares in the open 
market, it is restricted to buying 5% of the total outstanding shares before it must file 
with the SEC.  In filing, the company must formally declare how many shares it owns 
and whether it intends to buy the company or keep the shares purely as an investment. 
2.   The Target’s Response 
Once the tender offer has been made, the target company can do one of several 
things: 
• Accept the terms of the offer – If the target firm’s top managers and 
shareholders are happy with the terms of the transaction, they will go ahead 
with the deal. 
                                                 
12 An offer to purchase some or all of shareholders’ shares in a corporation.  The price offered is 
usually at a premium to the market price.  Tender offers may be friendly or unfriendly or unfriendly.  SEC 
laws require any corporation or individual acquiring 5% of a company to disclose information to the SEC, 
the target company, and the exchange. 
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• Attempt to negotiate – The tender offer price may not be high enough for the 
target company’s shareholders to accept, or the specific terms of the deal may 
not be attractive.  In a merger, there may be much at stake for the management 
of the of the target—their jobs in particular.  If management is not satisfied 
with the terms as presented in the tender offer, the target’s management may 
try to work out more agreeable terms that let them keep their jobs, or perhaps 
even better, the ability to exist justly compensated. 
• Execute a poison pill13 or some other hostile takeover14 defense – A poison 
pill defense can be triggered by a target company when a hostile suitor 
acquires a predetermined percentage of company stock.  To execute its 
defense, the target company grants all shareholders—except the acquirer—
options to buy additional stock at a dramatic discount.  This dilutes the 
acquirer’s share and intercepts its control of the company. 
• Find a white knight – As an alternative, the target company’s management 
may seek out a friendlier potential acquirer, or white knight.  If a white knight 
is found, it will offer an equal or higher price for the shares than the hostile 
bidder. 
3.   Closing the Deal 
Once the target company agrees to  the tender offer, and regulatory requirements 
are met, the merger deal will be executed by means of some transaction.  In a merger in 
which one company buys another, the acquirer will pay for the target company’s shares 
with cash, stock, or both. 
• A cash for stock transaction is fairly straightforward: target-company 
shareholders receive a cash payment for each share purchased.  This 
transaction is treated as a taxable sale of the shares of the target company. 
                                                 
13 A strategy used by a corporation to discourage a hostile takeover.  The target company attempts to 
make its stock less attractive to the to the acquirer.  There are two types of poison pills: 
 1.  A “flip-in” allows existing shareholders (except the acquirer) to buy more shares at a discount. 
2.  The “flip-over” allows shareholders to buy the acquirers shares at a discounted price after the 
merger. (www.investopedia.com) (11/20/05) 
14 A takeover attempt that is strongly resisted by the target firm. (www.investopedia.com) (11/20/05) 
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• If the transaction is made with stock instead of cash, then it is not taxable.  
There is simply an exchange of share certificates.  The desire to steer clear of 
the IRS is why so many merger an acquisition deals are carried out as cash for 
stock transactions. 
When a company is purchased with stock, new shares from the acquirer’s stock 
are issued directly to the target company’s shareholders, or the new shares are sent to a 
broker who manages them for target-company shareholders.  Only when the shareholder 
of the target company sell their new shares are they taxed. 
When the deal is closed, investors usually receive a new stock in their portfolio—
the acquiring company’s expanded stock.  Sometimes investors will get new stock 
identifying a new corporate entity that is created by the M&A deal. 
 
D. THE NEED FOR STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS  
The novelty of mergers or acquisitions conducted within the defense sector is that 
1). For most products and services, there is only one end user; and 2). The DoD has the 
power to block mergers that it deems to not be in the best interest of national defense, or 
that it determines will harm the taxpayer in any way.  In order for firms within the 
defense industry to avoid consolidation setbacks, stakeholder analysis must be conducted, 
making sure to assign the proper weighting to each stakeholder. 
1. What is Stakeholder Analysis? 
Stakeholder analysis is a process of systematically gathering and analyzing 
qualitative information, to determine whose interests should be taken into account when 
developing and/or implementing a program or plan.  It provides a visual means of 
identifying stakeholder support. 
Utilizing the influence-interest matrix will allow you to develop clusters of 






Table 2. Influence-Interest Matrix 
  Low Influence High Influence 
Low Stake least Priority Stakeholder Group useful for decision and opinion 
formulation, brokering 
High Stake important stakeholder group 
perhaps in need of empowerment 
most critical stakeholder group 
Source: http://hq.unhabitat.org/cdrom/governance/html/st.htm (11/21/2005) 
 
2. Who is a Stakeholder?  
Stakeholders in a process are actors (persons or organizations) with a vested 
interest in the policy being promoted.  The first step in stakeholder identification is to 
establish the stakeholder group.  There are five major stakeholder groups: 
Shareholders (traditional, institutional, socially responsible)  
Workplace (executives, employees, contractors, workers in supply chain)  
Community (where you source, operate, and sell)  
Marketplace (suppliers, customers, consumers)  
Environment (natural resources and systems)  
Next, these stakeholders or “interested parties,” can usually be grouped into the 
following categories: international/donors, national political (legislators/governors), 
public (Social Security Administration, Department of Veterans), labor (unions, medical 
associations), commercial/private for-profit, nonprofit (nongovernmental organization 
[NGO], foundations), civil society, and users/consumers.   
3. Which Stakeholder Characteristics are Analyzed? 
The analysis includes such stakeholder characteristics as knowledge of the policy, 
interests related, to the policy, position for or against the policy, potential alliances with 
other stakeholders, and ability to affect the policy process (through power and or 
leadership). 
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4. Major Steps in Stakeholder Analysis 
I. Planning the Process 
II. Selecting and Defining a Policy 
III. Identifying Key Stakeholders 
IV. Adapting the Tools 
V. Collecting and Recording the Information 
VI. Filling in the Stakeholder Table (Refer to Table 3) 
VII. Analyzing the Stakeholder Table 
VIII. Using the Information 
 
Table 3. Stakeholder Table 
 





   
     
     
Source:  http://www.hull.ac.uk/php/cesagh/documents/StakeholderAnalysis.rtf (11/22/2005) 
 
Plan strategies for approaching and involving each person or group. How to do 
this will usually depend on the results of the previous analysis. How involved each 
stakeholder is will depend on the appropriate type and level of participation. There is no 
need to involve reluctant stakeholders, and stakeholders may change their level of 
involvement as the process continues. Thus, partnerships should be flexible and designed 
to grow. 
5. Stakeholder Analysis Applied to the DoD 
The below table reflects the preparation of a stakeholder table by a generic 















Management High High If the terms of the 
acquisition are not 
agreeable with 
management’s strategic 
objectives, they may seek 
to block the 
merger/acquisition by 
seeking out a "White 





be not only in the best 
interest of 
shareholders, but also 
consistent with the 
goals and desire of the 
Board and Senior 
management. 
Shareholders High High Shareholders seek the 
greatest return on equity. 
The net benefits of the 
proposed deal must be 
made aware to 
shareholders. 
DoD High High Any acquisition needs to 
demonstrate increased 
value, and must not 
adversely effect 
competition. 
Defense firms must 
make aware to the 
DoD, the 
overwhelming net 
benefits of the 
proposed deal. 
Congress High High Congress does not want to 
see small or disadvantaged 
businesses negatively 
impacted as a result of the 
merger/acquisition.  
Congress would also like to 
see a reduction in taxpayer 
expenses as a result of the 
transaction. Congress 
would like to stem the 
erosion of the defense 
industrial base. 
Congress must ensure 
that anti-competitive 
practices are not 
taking place. 
Taxpayers High Moderate Taxpayers would like to see 
their tax dollars utilized in 
the most efficient manner 
practicable.  An overall 
reduction in tax burden is 
also desired by taxpayers. 
The net benefits of the 
proposed deal must be 





Low Low Foreign defense contractors 
are actively attempting to 
enter the U.S. defense 
market.  They are 
increasingly seeking to 
establish joint partnerships 
with U.S. defense 
contractors. 
Foreign defense firms 
must demonstrate that 
by allowing them to 
enter the U.S. defense 
industry, 
1).Competition will 
increase, 2). Prices for 
products and services 
will decrease, 3). 
Innovation and quality 
will improve, 4). 
National security will 
not be compromised. 
Foreign 
Governments 
Low Low Any practices deemed to be 
anti-competitive will be 
disputed by foreign nations.  
Retaliation in the form of 
increased tariffs will be 
considered by the 
governments of foreign 
nations.  
Allied nations should 
jointly work together  to 
open each country's 
defense industry to 
foreign competition. 
Source: Thesis Author 
 
 
E. WHY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS FAIL 
Those who advocate mergers will argue that the merger will cut costs or boost 
revenues by more than enough to justify the price premium.  The argument often appears 
to be oh so simple: just combine computer systems, merge a few departments, use sheer 
size to force down the price of supplies, and the merged giant should be more profitable 
than its parts.  The argument sounds appealing, but in practice, the song often carries a 
markedly different tune. 
Historical trends show that roughly two thirds of big mergers will disappoint on 
their own terms, which means they will lose value on the stock market.  Motivations 
behind mergers can be flawed and efficiencies from economies of scale may prove 
elusive. 
1. Flawed Intentions 
During times of over exuberance in the stock market, M&A activity increases.  
Deals done with highly rated stock as currency are easy and cheap, but the strategic 
thinking behind them may also prove easy and cheap.  On many occasions, mergers are 
attempts to imitate: a competitor has carried out a big merger, which prompts top 
executives to follow suit. 
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Mergers often have more to do with glory-seeking than business strategy.  The 
executive ego, which is boosted by buying the competition, is a major force in mergers 
and acquisitions, especially when combined with the influences from the bankers, 
lawyers, and other assorted advisors who can earn big commissions from clients engaged 
in mergers.  Most CEO reach the top through their will to succeed, and many top 
executives get a big bonus for merger deals, no matter what happens to the share price 
later. 
On the other side, mergers can be driven by generalized fear.  Globalization, 
Department of Defense expenditure cuts,  the arrival of new technological developments, 
or a fast-changing economic landscape that makes the outlook uncertain are all factors 
that can create a strong incentive for defensive mergers.  Sometimes the management 
team feels they have no choice and must acquire a rival before being acquired.  The idea 
is that only big players will survive a more competitive world. 
2. The Obstacles to Making the Deal Work 
Coping with a merger can make top managers spread their time too thinly, at the 
expense of their core business.  Too often, potential difficulties seem trivial to managers 
caught up in the thrill of the big deal. 
The chances for success are further hampered if the corporate cultures of the 
companies are very different.  A study conducted in 2000 by McKinsey & Co. found that 
a company’s highest return ratio is the “return on talent,” the company must ensure that it 
maintains the most desirable personnel when the smoke clears.  When a company is 
acquired, the decision is typically based on product or market synergies, but cultural 
differences are often ignored.  It is a mistake to assume that personnel issues are easily 
overcome.  For example, employees at a target company might be accustomed to easy 
access to top management, flexible work schedules, or even a relaxed dress code.  These 
aspects of a working environment may not seem significant, but if new management 
removes them, the result can be resentment and shrinking productivity.  
A 2001 McKinsey & Co. study titled “Why mergers fail,” concluded that 
companies often fail to focus on revenue growth, with the expectation that revenues will 
just continue to roll in.  The study goes on to mention that most companies lose their 
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revenue momentum while concentrating on cost synergies or failing to focus 
systematically on post-merger growth.  
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IV. REGULATIONS GOVERNING MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
A. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES15 
Corporations involved in merger and acquisition activity must not only comply 
with the rules and regulations as set forth by the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) Division of Corporation Finance16, but they also must adhere to the principles and 
guidelines as promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).  Responsibility for conducting antitrust reviews and approving 
mergers and acquisitions lies with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission.  In 1992, the DoJ and the FTC jointly issued Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
revising the DoJ’s 1984 Merger Guidelines and the FTC’s 1982 Statement Concerning 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  According to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
Guideline’s tenet is as follows: 
Central to the 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines is a recognition that sound merger 
enforcement is an essential component of our free enterprise system 
benefiting the competitiveness of American firms and the welfare of 
American consumers. Sound merger enforcement must prevent 
anticompetitive mergers yet avoid deterring the larger universe of pro-
competitive or competitively neutral mergers. The 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines implement this objective by describing the analytical 
foundations of merger enforcement and providing guidance enabling the 
business community to avoid antitrust problems when planning mergers. 
The Department first released Merger Guidelines in 1968 in order to 
inform the business community of the analysis applied by the Department 
to mergers under the federal antitrust laws. The 1968 Merger Guidelines 
eventually fell into disuse, both internally and externally, as they were 
eclipsed by developments in legal and economic thinking about mergers. 
(Horizontal Merger 1) 
                                                 
15 With April 8, 1997, Revisions to Section 4 on efficiencies. 
16 The Division of Corporation Finance oversees corporate disclosure of important information to the 
investing public. Corporations are required to comply with regulations pertaining to disclosure that must be 
made when stock is initially sold and then on a continuing and periodic basis. The Division's staff routinely 
reviews the disclosure documents filed by companies. The staff also provides companies with assistance 




The Guidelines describe the analytical process that the Agency will employ in 
determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger.  The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines are comprised of five key sections, with subsequent subsections as listed 
below:     
1. Market Definition, Measurement and Concentration   
The Agency assesses whether the merger would significantly increase 
concentration and result in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured. 
a. Product Market Definition 
The Agency will first define the relevant product market with respect to 
each of the products of each of the merging firms 
(i) Product Market Definition in the Presence of Price 
Discrimination:  The analysis of product market definition to this point has assumed that 
price discrimination--charging different buyers different prices for the same product, for 
example--would not be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist. A different analysis 
applies where price discrimination would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist. 
(ii) Geographic Market Definition:  For each product market in 
which both merging firms participate, the Agency will determine the geographic market 
or markets in which the firms produce or sell.   
• General Standards:  Absent price discrimination, the Agency will delineate 
the geographic market to be a region such that a hypothetical monopolist that 
was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at locations in 
that region would profitably impose at least a "small but significant and non-
transitory17" increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for all 
products produced elsewhere. That is, assuming that buyers likely would 
respond to a price increase on products produced within the tentatively 
identified region only by shifting to products produced at locations of 
production outside the region, what would happen? 
• Geographic Market Definition in the Presence of Price Discrimination:  The 
Agency will consider additional geographic markets consisting of particular 
                                                 
17 Non-transitory: Anything lasting a long time. 
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locations of buyers for which a hypothetical monopolist would profitably and 
separately impose at least a "small but significant and non-transitory" increase 
in price. 
(iii). Identification of Firms that Participate in the Relevant 
Market:   
• Current Producers or Sellers:  The Agency's identification of firms that 
participate in the relevant market begins with all firms that currently produce 
or sell in the relevant market. 
• Firms that Participate through Supply Response:  The Agency will identify 
other firms (uncommitted entrants) not currently producing or selling the 
relevant product in the relevant area as participating in the relevant market if 
their inclusion would more accurately reflect probable supply responses. 
1. Production Substitution and Extension-- The Switching or 
Extension of Existing Assets to Production or Sale in the 
Relevant Market:  Production substitution refers to the shift by 
a firm in the use of assets from producing and selling one 
product to producing and selling another. Production extension 
refers to the use of those assets, for example, existing brand 
names and reputation, both for their current production and for 
production of the relevant product. Depending upon the speed 
of that shift and the extent of sunk costs incurred in the shift or 
extension, the potential for production substitution or extension 
may necessitate treating as market participants firms that do 
not currently produce the relevant product. 
2. Obtaining New Assets for Production or Sale of the Relevant 
Product:  If new firms, or existing firms without closely related 
products or productive assets, likely would enter into 
production or sale in the relevant market within one year 
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without the expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and 
exit, the Agency will treat those firms as market participants. 
(iv). Calculating Market Shares: 
• General Approach:  The Agency normally will calculate market shares for all 
firms (or plants) identified as market participants in Section 1.3 based on the 
total sales or capacity currently devoted to the relevant market together with 
that which likely would be devoted to the relevant market in response to a 
"small but significant and non-transitory" price increase. 
• Price Discrimination:  When markets are defined on the basis of price 
discrimination (Sections 1.12 and 1.22), the Agency will include only sales 
likely to be made into, or capacity likely to be used to supply, the relevant 
market in response to a "small but significant and non-transitory" price 
increase. 
• Special Factors Affecting Foreign Firms:  Market shares will be assigned to 
foreign competitors in the same way in which they are assigned to domestic 
competitors. However, if exchange rates fluctuate significantly, so that 
comparable dollar calculations on an annual basis may be unrepresentative, 
the Agency may measure market shares over a period longer than one year. 
(v). Concentration of Market Shares:  Market concentration is a 
function of the number of firms in a market and their respective market shares. As an aid 
to the interpretation of market data, the Agency will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index18 ("HHI") of market concentration. 
• General Standards:  In evaluating horizontal mergers, the Agency will 
consider both the post-merger market concentration and the increase in 
concentration resulting from the merger. 
                                                 
18 The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the 
participants.  For example, a market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30 percent, 30 percent, 
20 percent and 20 percent has an HHI of 2600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 2600). The HHI ranges from 10,000 
(in the case of a pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). 
Although it is desirable to include all firms in the calculation, lack of information about small firms is not 
critical because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly. (Horizontal Merger 25) 
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• Factors Affecting the Significance of Market Shares and Concentration:  In 
some situations, market share and market concentration data may either 
understate or overstate the likely future competitive significance of a firm or 
firms in the market or the impact of a merger. 
1. Changing Market Conditions:  The Agency will consider 
reasonably predictable effects of recent or ongoing changes in 
market conditions in interpreting market concentration and 
market share data. 
2. Degree of difference Between the Products and Locations in 
the Market and Substitutes Outside the Market:  All else equal, 
the magnitude of potential competitive harm from a merger is 
greater if a hypothetical monopolist would raise price within 
the relevant market by substantially more than a "small but 
significant and non-transitory" amount. 
2.  The Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Mergers 
  The Agency assesses whether the merger, in light of market concentration and 
other factors that characterize the market, raises concern about potential adverse 
competitive effects. 
a. Lessening of Competition Through Coordinated Interaction 
A merger may diminish competition by enabling the firms selling in the 
relevant market more likely, more successfully, or more completely to engage in 
coordinated interaction that harms consumers.  The Agency will examine the extent to 
which post-merger market conditions are conducive to reaching terms of coordination, 
detecting deviations from those terms, and punishing such deviations. 
(i). Lessening of Competition Through Unilateral Effects:  A 
merger may diminish competition even if it does not lead to increased likelihood of 
successful coordinated interaction, because merging firms may find it profitable to alter 
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their behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing 
output. 
• Firms Distinguished Primarily by Differentiated Products:  In some markets 
the products are differentiated, so that products sold by different participants 
in the market are not perfect substitutes for one another.  In this setting, 
competition may be non-uniform (i.e., localized), so that individual sellers 
compete more directly with those rivals selling closer substitutes. 
1. Closeness of the Products of the Merging Firms:  The market 
concentration measures provide a measure of this effect if each 
product's market share is reflective of not only its relative 
appeal as a first choice to consumers of the merging firms' 
products but also its relative appeal as a second choice.  If the 
merging firms have a combined market share of at least thirty-
five percent, the Agency will presume that a significant share 
of sales in the market are accounted for by consumers who 
regard the products of the merging firms as their first and 
second choices. 
2. Ability of Rival Sellers to Replace Lost Competition:  A 
merger is not likely to lead to unilateral elevation of prices of 
differentiated products if, in response to such an effect, rival 
sellers likely would replace any localized competition lost 
through the merger by repositioning their product lines. 
 Firms Distinguished Primarily by Their Capacities:  
Where products are relatively undifferentiated and 
capacity primarily distinguishes firms and shapes the 
nature of their competition, the merged firm may find it 
profitable unilaterally to raise price and suppress 
output. The merger provides the merged firm a larger 
base of sales on which to enjoy the resulting price rise 
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and also eliminates a competitor to which customers 
otherwise would have diverted their sales. 
3. Entry Analysis   
The Agency assesses whether entry would be timely, likely and sufficient either 
to deter or to counteract the competitive effects of concern. 
a. Entry Alternatives   
The Agency will examine the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of the 
means of entry (entry alternatives) a potential entrant might practically employ, 
without attempting to identify who might be potential entrants. 
b. Timeliness of Entry   
The Agency generally will consider timely only those committed entry 
alternatives that can be achieved within two years from initial planning to 
significant market impact. 
c. Likelihood of Entry   
An entry alternative is likely if it would be profitable at pre-merger prices, 
and if such prices could be secured by the entrant. 
d. Sufficiency of Entry   
Where the concern is unilateral price elevation as a result of a merger 
between producers of differentiated products, entry, in order to be sufficient, must 
involve a product so close to the products of the merging firms that the merged 
firm will be unable to internalize enough of the sales loss due to the price rise, 
rendering the price increase unprofitable. 
4. Efficiencies   
The Agency assesses any efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be achieved by 
the parties through other means. 
a. The Agency will consider only those efficiencies likely to be 
accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the 
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absence of either the proposed merger or another means having comparable 
anticompetitive effects. 
b. The Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable19 efficiencies are 
of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be 
anticompetitive in any relevant market. 
5. Failure and Exiting Assets  
The Agency assesses whether, but for the merger, either party to the transaction 
would be likely to fail, causing its assets to exit the market. 
a. Failing Firm   
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
exercise if the following circumstances are met: 
(i). The allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial 
obligations in the near future; 
(ii). It would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Act; 
(iii). It has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable 
alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would both keep its 
tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to 
competition than does the proposed merger; 
(iv). Absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the 
relevant market. 
b. Failing Division   
A division is considered to be “failing” if it meets the following criteria: 
(i). Upon applying appropriate cost allocation rules, the division must 
have a negative cash flow on an operating basis; 
                                                 
19 Cognizable efficiencies are merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise 
from anticompetitive reductions in output or service. Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs 
produced by the merger or incurred in achieving those efficiencies. 
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(ii). Absent the acquisition, it must be that the assets of the division 
would exit the relevant market in the near future if not sold. 
 
B. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines were created to provide oversight where 
mergers between prime contractors and subcontractors (suppliers), also known as vertical 
integration, were concerned.  The Defense Science Board (DSB) defines vertically 
integrated firms as those that either do satisfy, or are able to satisfy, some or all of the 
inputs for their products or services internally (from within the firm).  One simple way to 
illustrate the concept of vertical integration is to think of any industry as consisting of 
vertical “tiers” of products or services.  Companies in lower tiers provide components for 
inclusion in higher-tier firms’ products.   
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are concerned that 
non-horizontal mergers, if left un-regulated, would create obstructions to competition in 
the following four ways: 
a. Preferring internal over external suppliers:  Gaining new internal 
sources of supply may cause a parent to favor the internal source over 
the external suppliers, even if external suppliers are superior. 
b. Increasing barriers to market entry:  Vertically integrated firms who 
refuse to supply their competitors, or choose to supply them on 
undesirable terms, can raise barriers to the market entry of their 
competitors. 
c. Compromising proprietary information:  The merger or acquisition of 
a firm’s supplier by a competitor raises concerns about inappropriate 
use of the firm’s proprietary information by the competitor in markets 
where the two firms compete. 
d. Refusing to use suppliers owned by competitors:  After a merger or 
acquisition that restructures the vertical relationship between firms, 
competitors may be reluctant to enter into supply or teaming 
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arrangements with the consolidated firm for fear that the firm could 
act to disadvantage its competitors. 
All mergers involving the vertical integration of suppliers are reviewed to ensure 
that anti-competitive practices do not occur.  The principal theories under which the 
Department of Justice is likely to challenge non-horizontal mergers will be outlined 
below. 
1. Elimination of Specific Potential Entrants 
a. Theory 
(i). Harm to “Perceived Potential Competition”:  By 
eliminating a significant present competitive threat that constrains the behavior of the 
firms already in the market, the merger could result in an immediate deterioration in 
market performance. 
(ii). Harm to “Actual Potential Competition”:  By eliminating 
the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more pro-competitive manner, the 
merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in market performance 
resulting from the addition of a significant competitor. 
• Relation Between Perceived and Actual Potential Competition:  Actual 
potential competition has independent importance. Firms already in the 
market may not find it optimal to set price low enough to deter all entry; 
moreover, those firms may misjudge the entry advantages of a particular firm 
and, therefore, the price necessary to deter its entry. 
• Enforcement Standards:  The Department of Justice will consider any specific 
evidence presented by the merging parties to show that the inferences of 
competitive harm drawn from the objective factors are unreliable.  The factors 
that the Department will consider are as follows: 
1. Market Concentration:  Barriers to entry are unlikely to affect 
market performance if the structure of the market is otherwise 
not conducive to monopolization or collusion. 
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2. Conditions of Entry Generally:  If entry to the market is 
generally easy, the fact that entry is marginally easier for one 
or more firms is unlikely to affect the behavior of the firms in 
the market. 
3. The Acquiring Firms Entry Advantage:  If more than a few 
firms have the same or a comparable advantage in entering the 
acquired firm's market, the elimination of one firm is unlikely 
to have any adverse competitive effect. 
4. The Market Share of the Acquired Firm:  Entry through the 
acquisition of a relatively small firm in the market may have a 
competitive effect comparable to new entry. Small firms 
frequently play peripheral roles in collusive interactions, and 
the particular advantages of the acquiring firm may convert a 
fringe firm into a significant factor in the market. 
5. Efficiencies:  The Department of Justice will consider expected 
efficiencies in determining whether to challenge a potential 
competition merger. 
2. Competitive Problems from Vertical Mergers   
a. Barriers to Entry from Vertical Merger   
The vertical integration resulting from vertical mergers could create 
competitively objectionable barriers to entry. 
(i). Need for Two-Level Entry:  The Department is unlikely to 
challenge a merger on this ground where post-merger sales (or purchases) by 
unintegrated firms in the secondary market would be sufficient to service two minimum-
efficient-scale plants in the primary market. 
(ii). Increased Difficulty of Simultaneous Entry of Both 
Markets:  If entry at the secondary level is easy in absolute terms, the requirement of 
simultaneous entry to that market is unlikely adversely to affect entry to the primary 
market. 
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(iii). Structure and Performance of the Primary Market:  Barriers 
to entry are unlikely to affect performance if the structure of the primary market is 
otherwise not conducive to monopolization or collusion. 
b. Facilitating Collusion through Vertical Mergers 
(i). Vertical Integration to the Retail Level:  A high level of 
vertical integration by upstream firms into the associated retail market may facilitate 
collusion in the upstream market by making it easier to monitor price.20 
(ii). Elimination of a Disruptive Buyer:  The elimination by 
vertical merger of a particularly disruptive buyer in a downstream market may facilitate 
collusion in the upstream market. 
c. Evasion of Rate Regulation   
Non-horizontal mergers may be used by monopoly public utilities 
subject to rate regulation as a tool for circumventing that regulation.21 
d. Efficiencies   
An extensive pattern of vertical integration may constitute evidence 
that substantial economies are afforded by vertical integration. Therefore, the Department 
will give relatively more weight to expected efficiencies in determining whether to 
challenge a vertical merger than in determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger. 
                                                 
20 Retail prices are generally more visible than prices in upstream markets, and vertical mergers may 
increase the level of vertical integration to the point at which the monitoring effect becomes significant. 
(Non-Horizontal 6) 
21 The clearest example is the acquisition by a regulated utility of a supplier of its fixed or variable 
inputs. After the merger, the utility would be selling to itself and might be able, arbitrarily, to inflate the 
prices of internal transactions. 
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V. OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE FIRMS 
ENGAGED IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters addressed the history of the defense industry in relation to 
the Cold War, the fundamental reasons behind mergers and acquisitions, and the 
regulations governing merger and acquisition activity.  There are many firms within the 
defense industry, so it was necessary to pare the group down to a manageable size.  First, 
the Defense News’ Top 10022 was reviewed to gain insight as to the largest and most 
relevant participants in the defense industry.  Next, Thomson Financial’s Merger & 
Acquisition database was analyzed in detail, for data on acquisition activity within the 
defense industry.  Once the data was reviewed, and the sample group was established, a 
method on analysis needed to be developed. 
Two of the principle objectives of this thesis were to 1). Compute the capital 
gains performance of each defense firm, and the performance of the group as a whole, 
and 2). Determine the operating performance of each defense firm as a result of M&A 
activity, through an analysis of the Income Statement, the Balance Sheet, and the 
Statement of Cash Flows.  This chapter presents the quantitative results of defense sector 
consolidation on a company-by-company basis. 
 
B. METHODS OF COMPUTATION 
The first step necessary when attempting to quantify data is to gather accurate 
figures and information.  Once the information and data has been gathered, a method of 
analysis must be developed.  Listed below are the steps that were taken to yield the 
results covered in the next section: 
1. Monthly closing stock price figures were gathered from Microsoft Money 
Central23.   
                                                 
22 (http://www.defensenews.com/content/features/2005chart1.html) (05/25/05) 
23 (http://c05.moneycentral.msn.com/investor/charts/chartdl.asp) (05/25/05) 
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a. Data covers a 15 year period (September 1990 thru September 
2005) 
b. Monthly closing stock price figures for Lockheed Martin (LMT), 
Boeing Co (BA), General Dynamics (GD), Goodrich Corp (GR), 
Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon Co (RTN), L-3 
Communications Holdings (LLL), Alliant Techsystems (ATK), 
and the Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX) were utilized. 
2. Relative price trend charts were developed for each firm to illustrate the 
firms’ capital gain performance relative to the S&P 500.  
3. A returns weighed portfolio index was created, measuring the relative 
performance of the portfolio, on a monthly-adjusted basis.24 
4. The monthly and quarterly return for each firm was calculated.25 
a. A “sample” average quarterly return was calculated by averaging 
the quarterly returns for the defense firms, for each quarter. 
b. A “sample” yearly return was calculated by summing the average 
quarterly returns for the defense firms, for each year. 
5. An annual return for each firm was calculated. 
6. A capital gains model was developed, which measured each firms risk 
profile relative to the market, over the 15-year period.26 
a. The average annual return for each firm was computed; 
b. Each firm’s standard deviation was computed;27 
c. Each firm’s beta was computed.28 
                                                 
24 (Monthly Return for each firm * Relative Monthly Closing Market Capitalization of each firm) / 
Sum of the Market Capitalizations of the group. 
25 (Current Month – Previous Month) / Previous Month. 
26 The data available for L-3 Communications (LLL) covered seven years.  
27 Standard deviation is a statistical measure of the degree to which a given return will fall 
within a range of returns based on the historical experience of a fund. It is used to assess the 
level of volatility or risk associated with a given return. The lower the standard deviation, the lower 
the volatility or risk. (www.abriafunds.com/education_glossary_of_terms.html) (11/03/05) 
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7. Each firm’s Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Statement of Cash 
Flows was analyzed, in order to gauge each firms operating performance 
as a result of their merger and acquisition activity.  The growth rate was 
computed for the year of the merger/acquisition, and the two years 
following the merger/acquisition.  The relevant data from each statement 
is listed below: 
a. Statement of Cash Flows 
i. Net Earnings 
ii. Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities 
b. Income Statement 
i. Net Sales 
ii. Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA) 
c. Balance Sheet 
i. Total Shareholders Equity 
8. Sample group average growth rates were calculated, in order to gauge 
each firm’s performance relative to the other firms in the sample group. 
 
C.   RESULTS OF ANALYSIS:  WHAT THE DATA TELLS US 
Firms engaged in merger and acquisition activity do so for the underlying reason 
that the transactions are expected to improve the long-term prospects of the firms 
engaged in the merger/acquisition.  Two areas whereby improvement should take place 
would be: 
                                                 
28 Beta is the measure of a fund's volatility relative to the market. (Almost all fund managers 
correlate themselves to the S&P 500). A beta of greater than 1.0 indicates that the fund is more 
volatile than the market, and less than 1.0 is less volatile than the market. For example, if the 
market rises 1% and a fund has a beta greater than 2.5, the fund will rise, on average, 2.5%. For 
a fund with a beta of 0.4, if the market rises 1%, the fund will rise on average, 0.4%.  
(www.hedgefund.net/glossary.php3) (11/03/05) 
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1. Operating performance: As displayed in the Balance Sheet, Income 
Statement, and Statement of Cash Flows.  Over time, positive increases in 
operating performance will be reflected as a higher stock price, thereby 
netting increases in capital gains. 
2. Stock price appreciation (capital gains). 
The Thomson Financial Merger and Acquisition database provides historical 
information on M&A activity within various industries and sectors of the market.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, the database has been filtered to list only those 
mergers/acquisitions that have taken place within the U.S., since 1990, and were 
conducted by firms involved in the manufacture of aircrafts and tanks.29  Review Table 5 
for the results of the search. 
 
Table 5.  Merger & Acquisition Database 
Lockheed Martin (LMT) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
3/30/1995 Merger between Lockheed Corp. and Martin Marietta  N/A  
1993 GE Aerospace  $                                                      883  
1996 Loral Corp  $                                                   7,344  
11/3/1997 14.9% stake in  Northrop Grumman  $                                                   2,757  
1999 49% stake in COMSAT  $                                                   1,203  
2003 Affiliated Computer Services  $                                                      585  
   
Boeing Co (BA) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
7/11/1996 2.3% stake in LTV Aerospace & Defense Co  $                                                 703.95  
8/1/1996 Rockwell Intl Corp-Aerospace  $                                             3,085.70  
12/17/1996 McDonnell Douglas Corp  $                                                 13,359  
5/4/2004 Fairchild Dornier Corp  N/A  
   
General Dynamics (GD) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
7/30/1999 3.5% buyback of Gulfstream Aerospace Corp  $                                                      114  
6/30/2000 4.8% buyback of Saco Defense Corp  $                                                      137  
1/26/2001 Primex Technologies Inc  $                                             5,419.72  
6/5/2001 4.9% buyback of Galaxy Aerospace Corp  $                                              378.125  
6/14/2002 Advanced Technical Products  N/A  
7/9/2004 Spectrum Astro Inc  $                                              516.588  
                                                 
29 The Standard & Poor’s NetAdvantage was also utilized during this research effort to gather 
information on M&A activity. (www.netadvantage.standardandpoors.com) (05/04/05)  
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Goodrich Corp (GR) 
Date Transaction   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
5/31/2002 
Spin-off of Coodrich Corp-Engineered land to 
shareholders  N/A  
3/31/2002 Sale of Avionics Systems to L-3 Communications  N/A  
   
Northrop Grumman (NOC) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
3/10/1994 General Dynamics' - Ft. Worth Division  $                                                   2,104  
5/18/1994 Grumman Corp  $                                                   1,842  
8/31/1994 Vought Aircraft Co  $                                                      142  
6/2/1999 Ryan Aeronautical  $                                                      140  
5/30/2001 Litton Industries Inc  $                                                   5,158  
10/22/2001 Aero Jet - Gen. Corp  $                                                      315  
12/11/2002 TRW Inc  $                                                   6,677  
   
Raytheon Co (RTN) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
11/23/1992 7.42% buyback of Cessna Aircraft  $                                                      450  
2/24/1994 8.9% buyback of General Dynamics' Missle Business   $                                                   736.5  
1/16/1997 McDonnell Douglas Corp  $                                                   9,500  
12/18/1997 Hughes Aircraft  N/A  
6/13/2003 65% stake in Flight Options LLC  N/A  
   
L-3 Communications Holdings (LLL) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
3/11/2002 Raytheon Co - Aircraft Integration  $                                                      115  
3/31/2003 Goodrich Avionics Systems  $                                                   1,130  
6/12/2003 AeroMet Inc  $                                                      188  
12/21/2004 EER Systems Corp  N/A  
1/5/2005 BAI Aerosystems Inc  $                                                         20  
2/25/2005 General Dynamics Corp - Propulsion  N/A  
3/1/2005 Boeing Electron Dynamic  $                                                      185  
   
Alliant Techsystems (ATK) 
Date Acquired Firm   Transaction Value ($'s in Millions)  
5/31/2002 Boeing Co - Ordinance Business  $                                                     15.4  
10/28/2002 Science & Applied Technology  $                                              129.153  
11/21/2003 Allied Aerospace - Hypersonic  $                                                 60.688  
3/15/2004 Mission Research Corp  $                                                      685  
Source: Information compiled by author from Standard & Poor's NetAdvantage and Thomson 
Financials M&A database. 
 
1. Operating Performance 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter titled “Why Do Firms Engage in Merger and 
Acquisition Activity?”, mergers/acquisitions are entered into as a means by which to 
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create shareholder value over and above that of the sum of the two companies involved in 
the transaction.  The two combined companies are expected to carry more value than two 
separate companies.  The vehicle through which this is achieved is called synergy.  For 
more information on how firms achieve synergy, please review Chapter III.   
a. Defense Sector Operating Performance [Refer to Table 12 & 
Table 13 titled “DEFENSE INDUSTRY FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE”] 
In terms of operating performance, the results of the defense sector 
mergers/acquisitions are mixed.  Using the year prior to the acquisition as a base, an 
acceleration in growth rate was only achieved in the Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, and Amortization.  Though the growth rate for each of the five measured 
categories remained positive when comparing the acquisition year to the second year 
after the transaction, two out of five categories (Income Growth (-22.80%) and Cash 
Flow Growth (-2.40%)) actually experienced negative growth between the first and 
second years after the transaction.  Granted, firms performed to varying degrees in each 
of the five measured categories, but as a whole, the financial results of the M&A activity 
were mild. 
On the surface, marked improvements to profitability do not appear to 
have materialized as a result of the merger/acquisition activity.  The main reason for the 
transactions may have more to do with survival in a dwindling industry, and maintaining 
a competitive edge, and less to do with the attainment of synergies, and subsequent 
improvements in financial performance. 
2.   Capital Gains Performance [Refer to Table 6 & Table 11 in the 
Appendix] 
The previous section on Operating Performance displayed that the benefits of 
mergers/acquisitions are not necessarily synergistic in effect, but instead can come to 
fruition through improvements in the competitive position of a firm, or can assist a firm 
in surviving in a shrinking industry.  This section will detail the stock price appreciation 
that has materialized because of the defense sector industry consolidation.   
During the period covering September 1990 thru September 2005, each of the 
sampled defense firms outperformed the S&P 500 Index (9.77%), on an annualized basis, 
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with the exception of Raytheon (9.77%), which had an identical return [See Table 6].  
Had you invested in a portfolio containing the eight defense firms listed below, you 
would have received an annual return of 15.49%.  The portfolio’s standard deviation of 
17.03% was only 2.78% higher than the markets, yet the return exceeded the markets by 
58.55%.  This is a tradeoff that most investors would be willing to accept. 
The ability of the defense firms to outperform the market over the past 15 years, 
leads one to conclude that the market placed a high value on the consolidation of the 
defense sector.  As sensible consolidation within the defense industry continues, the 
certainty and stability of the survival of those firms that remain, increases.  It is no secret 
that the market values certainty and stability.   
 
Table 6. Average Annual Capital Gains from September 1990 – September 2005 
Capital Gains 
 LMT BA GD GR NOC RTN LLL (7yrs) ATK $INX Portfolio 
Return 15.62% 11.19% 23.04% 11.34% 17.00% 9.77% 13.88% 24.14% 9.77% 15.49% 
StdDev 26.48% 28.19% 27.21% 24.70% 26.16% 21.06% 22.51% 24.18% 16.57% 17.03% 
Beta -0.44 0.40 0.44 0.61 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.48 1.00 0.04 
Source: Thesis Author       
 
 
D. EFFECTS OF DEFENSE SECTOR CONSOLIDATION ON TAXPAYERS 
As the sole customer for most of the defense related products manufactured and 
sold in the United States, the Department of Defense has approval authority over defense 
related mergers and acquisitions.  The DoD’s primary concerns with regard to defense 
sector consolidation revolve around three key principles. 
1. How will the merger/acquisition affect national security? 
2. Will the defense industrial base be negatively affected as a result of the 
merger/acquisition? 
3. Will the taxpayer benefit from the merger/acquisition? 
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has lead responsibility for 
implementing the DoD’s restructuring regulations and for monitoring defense contractor 
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business combinations.  For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume that there are no 
conflicts with items one or two above. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Studies on Defense Restructuring 
Costs 
In two separate GAO reports conducted in 1996, it was determined that cost-
savings are realized as a result of defense sector restructuring.   
GAO performed the April 1996 study30 to ensure that the requirements as stated 
in Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 were 
strictly adhered to.  The GAO “…sought to determine whether the certification process 
was carried out in accordance with the interim regulations and whether restructuring had 
resulted in lower DoD contract prices.” (Defense Contractor 1)  The focus of the study 
was United Defense’s, Limited Partnership business combination between FMC 
Corporation’s Defense Systems Group and Harsco Corporation’s BMY-Combat Systems 
Division.  As a result of the consolidation, United Defense was able to move the final 
assembly and test of most product lines from California to Pennsylvania.  DoD received 
confirmation from the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command 
(TACOM), that United Defense’s restructuring efforts netted a savings to the DoD of 
$2.49 for every dollar in restructuring costs.  These savings were realized during a 
follow-on contract, when the new contract came in 11 percent lower than a previous 
contract for the same equipment.     
In September of 1996, GAO commissioned a study31 researching the realized 
savings from Martin-Marietta Corporation’s acquisition of GE Aerospace.  The report 
cited that “Although certified savings are less than initially estimated, the contractor’s 
overhead costs are lower as a result of savings from these projects.” (Defense 
Restructuring 2)  The DoD projected that Martin-Marietta would reduce DoD’s share of 
overhead costs by $2.01 for every dollar in restructuring costs.  DoD concluded: 
…The reduction in projected overhead costs is reflected in lower overhead 
rates for these business segments, and the lower overhead rates have been 
                                                 
30 Defense Contractor Restructuring: First Application of Cost and Savings Regulations.  (07/11/05) 
31 Defense Restructuring Costs: Projected and Actual Savings From Martin-Marietta Acquisition of 
GE Aerospace. (07/11/05) 
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provided to procuring activities for use in pricing DoD contracts.  When 
procuring activities use the lower rates, DoD’s contract price will be lower 
than they would have been had it not been for the restructuring under these 
five projects. (Defense Restructuring 6) 
The GAO reports illustrate that defense sector consolidation can have a positive 
impact on taxpayers in the form of lower contract prices., which equates to reduced 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the research presented in this thesis by reviewing the 
primary and secondary research questions and stating the conclusions that result from 
analysis of the compiled data.  This chapter concludes with the researcher’s 
recommended areas for further study and analysis. 
In order to fully grasp the answers provided by this thesis, and the analysis of the 
raw data, one must possess a basic understanding of the premise of this thesis (Will 
consolidation within the defense sector improve the financial performance of defense 
contractors, while simultaneously yielding cost savings to taxpayers?).   
The reader was first introduced to the events surrounding the Cold War.  An 
appreciation of the Cold War was an essential component of this thesis since the events 
surrounding the Cold War shaped the defense industry, and precipitated the need for 
today’s defense sector restructuring.  The reader was next educated on the fundamental 
reasons for mergers and acquisitions between firms.  An examination of the business case 
for M&As was conducted.  Stakeholder analysis was performed on the defense industry 
to gain a generic impression of the dynamic environment within the defense sector.  In 
Chapter IV, an outline of the Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
governing merger and acquisition activity within the U.S., was provided.   Chapter V 
provided the results of the analysis of the raw data.  The raw data was collected from 
various sources, and analyzed to gain concrete answers to the research questions.   GAO 
reports pertaining to the projected cost-benefits of past defense sector restructuring 
efforts were consulted. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
The expectation coming into this thesis was that the consolidation activity within 
the defense sector was primarily taking place in an effort to: 
1. Create a monopoly position for the firms involved; and 
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2. Make the shareholders wealthy at the expense of the taxpayers. 
It was also my belief that the acquisitions were taking place with very little meaningful 
oversight from the Department of Defense. 
Upon further review… 
At the conclusion of the research, my impressions of mergers and acquisitions 
took a 180 degree change in directions.  The research allowed for the positive and 
seemingly conclusive resolution of the following research questions: 
1. Why are firms interested in mergers and acquisitions?   
ANSWER: Firms engaged in mergers and acquisitions do so for a 
variety of reasons.  There is not one definitive “Right” answer.  Firms engage 
in M&As in order to obtain synergies, improve their competitive position, 
survive, etc…  Ultimately, placing the firms in a position to allow for 
management to uphold their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders is the 
overriding factor. 
2. Have the firms engaged in merger and acquisition activity increased their 
profitability? 
ANSWER: Some firms have achieved higher profitability in the wake 
of M&As, whereas other firms have fared less well.  As a whole, the mergers 
examined in this study did not appear to significantly improve profitability, 
nor did the mergers/acquisitions significantly harm profitability.  If there is 
not a improvement to profitability, why enter into M&As?  The answer may 
concern maintaining or achieving a superior competitive position in a 
declining industry.      
3. Have capital gains improved as a result of merger and acquisition 
activity? 
ANSWER: The data does not provide a definitive answer.  In terms of 
capital appreciation, the firms do not appear to fare better than prior to M&A 
transactions.  Over time, the capital gains appreciation for the eight firms 
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examined in this thesis are positive.  How much better or worse off the firms 
would have been had the transactions not taken place is difficult to surmise.   
4. Have the acquiring and merged firms outperformed the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index? 
ANSWER: With the exception of Raytheon, each firm significantly 
outperformed the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over the 15 year period 
evaluated.  Sustained performance of this magnitude makes it difficult to 
dispute the M&As executed by the eight defense firms.  The mergers must 
have been deemed to play a necessary part in the long-term success of the 
organizations involved. 
5. Has competition suffered as a result of defense sector consolidation? 
ANSWER: Competition does not appear to have been a casualty of 
defense sector consolidation.  In fact, the build-up during the Cold War era 
created an over supply of defense contractors.  A market correction is 
currently underway, which will bring the number of defense contractors more 
inline with the demand side of the equation. 
6. Has the government, and more importantly taxpayers benefited as a result 
of defense sector consolidation? 
ANSWER: Consolidation within the defense industry has yielded 
significant cost savings to taxpayers.  GAO has conducted studies which 
demonstrate this fact.  Over time, the tax savings will either make their way 
back to taxpayers in the form of lower tax rates, or the savings may be utilized 
by the DoD in recapitalization efforts.  
 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
In an effort to mitigate the effects, on the defense industrial base, of defense 
sector consolidation and reductions in U.S. defense spending, the Federal Government 
may want to consider increasing the scope of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.  
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Foreign military sales allows for U.S. defense firms to sell stripped down versions of 
their products to foreign militaries.   
By increasing their sales to foreign militaries, defense firms would be able to put 
idle capacity to use, thereby strengthening and stabilizing their organizations.  Another 
benefit of foreign military sales pertains to overhead rates.  With higher productions 
rates, U.S. defense firms would be able to spread their overhead costs over a greater 
number of products, thereby decreasing the cost of each finished product.  The increases 
in production runs resulting from FMS will also allow for the defense firms to move 
further down the learning curve.  The move down the learning curve will reduce the cost 
of production over time. 
The benefits resultant from learning curve efficiencies, and the spreading of 
overhead over a larger number of units, will net cost savings to the DoD, which will  
ultimately benefit taxpayers. 
 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several areas would benefit from further research into defense related mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Studies should be conducted in the following areas: 
• An analysis of the benefits and costs of cross border defense partnerships; 
• At what point will defense sector consolidation no longer be beneficial to 
taxpayers and the DoD; 
• How can the merger and acquisitions process be improved, to maximize 
the pool of available benefits to the DoD, taxpayers, and to shareholders; 




Table 7. Discretionary Outlays 
Discretionary Outlays ($'s in Billions)   
 Defense International Domestic  Total   
1979 116.8 9.1 114.1 240.0   
1980 134.6 12.8 128.9 276.3   
1981 158.0 13.6 136.3 307.9   
1982 185.9 12.9 127.1 326.0   
1983 209.9 13.6 129.8 353.3   
1984 228.0 16.3 135.1 379.4   
1985 253.1 17.4 145.3 415.8   
1986 273.8 17.7 147 438.5   
1987 282.5 15.2 146.5 444.2   
1988 290.9 15.7 157.8 464.4   
1989 304.0 16.6 168.2 488.8   
1990 300.1 19.1 181.4 500.6   
1991 319.7 19.7 193.9 533.3   
1992 302.6 19.2 212.1 533.8   
1993 292.4 21.6 225.4 539.4   
1994 282.3 20.8 238.3 541.4   
1995 273.6 20.1 251.2 544.9   
1996 266.0 18.3 248.4 532.7   
1997 271.7 19 256.6 547.2   
1998 270.2 18.1 263.8 552.1   
1999 275.5 19.5 277 572.0   
2000 295.0 21.3 298.6 614.8   
2001 306.1 22.5 320.8 649.3   
2002 348.9 26.2 359.2 734.3   
2003 404.9 27.9 392.6 825.4   
2004 454.1 33.8 407.1 895.0   
    
Discretionary Outlays as a Percentage of GDP 















1979 4.7 0.4 4.6 9.6   
1980 4.9 0.5 4.7 10.1 4.26% -0.53%
1981 5.2 0.4 4.5 10.1 6.12%  
1982 5.8 0.4 3.9 10.1 11.54%  
1983 6.1 0.4 3.8 10.3 5.17%  
1984 5.9 0.4 3.5 9.9 -3.28%  
1985 6.1 0.4 3.5 10 3.39%  
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1986 6.2 0.4 3.3 10 1.64%  
1987 6.1 0.3 3.1 9.5 -1.61%  
1988 5.8 0.3 3.1 9.3 -4.92%  
1989 5.6 0.3 3.1 9.1 -3.45%  
1990 5.2 0.3 3.2 8.7 -7.14%  
1991 5.4 0.3 3.3 9 3.85%  
1992 4.8 0.3 3.4 8.6 -11.11%  
1993 4.4 0.3 3.4 8.2 -8.33%  
1994 4.1 0.3 3.4 7.8 -6.82%  
1995 3.7 0.3 3.4 7.4 -9.76%  
1996 3.5 0.2 3.2 6.9 -5.41%  
1997 3.3 0.2 3.1 6.7 -5.71%  
1998 3.1 0.2 3.1 6.4 -6.06%  
1999 3 0.2 3 6.3 -3.23%  
2000 3 0.2 3.1 6.3 0.00%  
2001 3 0.2 3.2 6.5 0.00%  
2002 3.4 0.3 3.5 7.1 13.33%  
2003 3.7 0.3 3.6 7.6 8.82%  
2004 3.9 0.3 3.5 7.7 5.41%  
        
Source: Appendix F of the CBO publication The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal 
Years 2006 to 2015  
 
 
Table 8. Monthly Stock Market Return 
Monthly Return 
            
            
DATE LMT BA GD GR NOC RTN LLL ATK $INX Portfolio
Sep-05 -1.93% 1.39% 4.33% -3.23% -3.10% -3.06% -2.82% -2.96% 0.69% -0.22% 
Aug-05 -0.26% 1.53% -0.52% 3.57% 1.15% -0.28% 4.67% 5.38% -1.12% 1.02% 
Jul-05 -3.81% 0.02% 5.16% 8.01% 0.36% 0.54% 2.15% 3.40% 3.60% 0.65% 
Jun-05 -0.03% 3.29% 1.44% -2.15% -0.84% -0.10% 8.19% -1.53% -0.01% 1.58% 
May-05 6.46% 7.36% 2.79% 3.87% 1.60% 4.12% -0.27% 3.64% 3.00% 4.88% 
Apr-05 -0.18% 1.81% -1.87% 5.25% 1.59% -2.82% -0.07% -3.18% -2.01% 0.30% 
Mar-05 3.11% 6.35% 1.61% 3.40% 2.04% 1.20% -1.50% 3.21% -1.91% 3.32% 
Feb-05 2.44% 8.64% 2.03% 7.96% 1.97% 2.25% 0.97% 3.98% 1.89% 4.34% 
Jan-05 4.07% -2.26% -1.29% 5.09% -4.56% -3.68% -2.50% 1.84% -2.53% -1.14% 
Dec-04 -8.69% -3.36% -3.47% 2.80% -3.50% -3.74% -1.59% -0.74% 3.25% -4.05% 
Nov-04 10.44% 7.35% 6.11% 2.98% 8.85% 10.58% 12.88% 14.58% 3.86% 8.69% 
Oct-04 -1.24% -3.33% 0.02% -1.69% -2.96% -3.95% -1.60% -4.98% 1.40% -2.34% 
Sep-04 3.72% -1.15% 4.57% -1.26% 3.25% 9.36% 6.96% 4.42% 0.94% 3.05% 
Aug-04 1.49% 2.90% -1.19% -1.76% -1.81% 3.52% 2.44% -7.97% 0.23% 1.14% 
Jul-04 1.75% -0.67% -0.48% 0.00% -2.05% -6.21% -8.46% -0.60% -3.43% -1.45% 
Jun-04 5.13% 11.55% 3.84% 15.34% 4.14% 7.58% 4.80% 3.41% 1.80% 7.34% 
May-04 3.86% 7.29% 2.15% -2.64% 3.91% 3.07% 3.24% 3.31% 1.21% 4.31% 
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Apr-04 4.51% 3.94% 4.80% 2.57% 0.84% 2.94% 3.80% 8.99% -1.68% 3.64% 
Mar-04 -1.38% -5.30% -3.03% -4.82% -2.66% 3.09% 11.14% -4.73% -1.64% -1.82% 
Feb-04 -4.81% 3.88% 0.75% -4.41% 4.55% -0.36% 0.11% 1.96% 1.22% 1.01% 
Jan-04 -5.41% -0.93% 1.15% 3.91% 1.16% 1.56% 4.09% -3.05% 1.73% -0.44% 
Dec-03 11.89% 9.77% 11.77% 7.92% 3.21% 8.41% 9.16% 13.19% 5.08% 9.36% 
Nov-03 -0.91% -0.26% -3.38% -0.40% 3.61% 4.65% 0.66% -1.41% 0.71% 0.33% 
Oct-03 0.46% 12.12% 7.23% 13.94% 3.69% -5.43% 8.07% 7.72% 5.50% 5.70% 




15.35% -5.67% -1.19% -9.77% 
Aug-03 -2.12% 12.89% 8.53% 13.17% 3.51% 4.43% 4.10% -7.21% 1.79% 5.93% 
Jul-03 10.03% -3.50% 9.43% 9.52% 6.90% -6.52% 12.85% 5.76% 1.62% 3.96% 
Jun-03 2.48% 11.90% 8.50% 14.94% -1.61% 2.50% 0.32% 2.85% 1.13% 5.48% 
May-03 -7.25% 12.43% 7.65% 29.85% -0.28% 7.05% -2.36% -6.05% 5.09% 4.12% 
Apr-03 5.26% 8.86% 12.71% 0.07% 2.51% 5.50% 10.53% -0.54% 8.10% 6.74% 




















16.67% -6.11% -5.76% -2.15% -0.31% 
-
12.81% -2.74% -7.49% 
Dec-02 10.63% -3.11% -2.55% -0.43% 0.09% 5.42% -0.07% 5.68% -6.03% 2.15% 













13.14% 8.64% -9.81% 
Sep-02 2.13% -7.93% 3.42% -9.44% 1.01% 
-





10.72% -2.82% -6.45% 10.93% 7.43% 10.10% 11.11% 0.49% 0.20% 










14.41% -3.76% -7.90% -12.38% 
Jun-02 12.01% 5.51% 5.72% 
-




12.02% -7.25% 3.09% 
May-02 -1.35% -4.37% 3.62% 4.67% 0.54% 4.49% -1.24% 1.00% -0.91% -0.03% 
Apr-02 9.24% -7.56% 3.34% 0.88% 6.73% 3.05% 14.09% 5.60% -6.14% 2.70% 
Mar-02 2.07% 4.98% 3.38% 6.00% 5.61% 6.10% 1.96% 8.60% 3.67% 4.41% 
Feb-02 6.49% 12.23% 1.47% 7.30% -4.09% 1.10% 7.15% 5.52% -2.08% 5.21% 
Jan-02 13.50% 5.60% 12.46% 4.51% 10.71% 17.86% 13.91% 15.28% -1.56% 11.17% 
Dec-01 0.47% 10.48% -4.22% 9.23% 7.38% -0.92% 7.94% -2.03% 0.76% 4.15% 
Nov-01 -4.76% 7.67% 1.90% 14.15% -6.07% 1.61% -4.02% -9.70% 7.52% 0.74% 





39.22% 23.17% 32.18% 30.33% 23.40% -8.17% 4.51% 
Aug-01 0.61% 
-
12.52% -2.39% -8.27% 2.21% -8.97% 
-
10.05% 4.89% -6.41% -6.19% 
Jul-01 6.94% 5.27% 3.96% -8.00% 0.16% 8.78% -2.23% 10.34% -1.07% 4.43% 
Jun-01 -3.24% 
-




13.79% -5.73% -2.50% -8.36% 
May-01 8.90% 1.76% 0.57% 6.04% -1.65% 0.81% 14.56% 1.23% 0.51% 2.76% 
Apr-01 -1.37% 10.93% 22.86% 2.68% 3.74% 0.51% -2.15% 6.38% 7.68% 7.91% 
Mar-01 -4.83% 
-
10.43% -7.98% -5.12% -7.40% 
-
11.53% -3.70% 4.48% -6.42% -8.41% 
Feb-01 8.02% 6.32% -3.94% 12.33% 8.39% -5.63% 2.21% 22.29% -9.23% 4.51% 
Jan-01 2.15% 
-
11.36% -9.00% -1.03% 4.43% 13.29% 4.17% 3.82% 3.46% -2.86% 
Dec-00 -0.44% -4.43% 2.30% -3.96% -1.56% 
-
11.41% 19.15% 8.54% 0.41% -2.53% 
Nov-00 -4.88% 1.84% 6.55% -7.48% 0.37% 2.56% -1.99% 2.57% -8.01% 1.08% 
Oct-00 8.87% 5.14% 13.93% 4.47% -7.57% 20.22% 16.70% 9.51% -0.49% 7.31% 
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Sep-00 16.05% 20.24% -0.20% -4.02% 16.76% 2.65% -4.44% 6.57% -5.35% 13.37% 
Aug-00 0.89% 9.89% 11.52% 14.40% 9.52% 13.95% 0.42% 8.92% 6.07% 9.33% 
Jul-00 13.35% 16.74% 8.01% 4.77% 7.26% 26.30% 3.09% 4.94% -1.63% 13.98% 






17.87% 1.98% -2.29% 2.39% -2.38% 
May-00 -0.75% -1.57% 0.96% 12.25% 8.11% 5.63% 5.16% -0.90% -2.19% 2.20% 
Apr-00 21.71% 4.96% 17.59% 10.24% 33.88% 25.00% 2.53% 18.26% -3.08% 15.71% 
Mar-00 17.20% 2.37% 15.03% 19.84% 16.83% -4.05% 22.03% 8.78% 9.67% 8.69% 
Feb-00 -5.74% 
-









10.66% -9.09% -7.05% 
-
14.12% -3.30% 4.11% -5.09% -2.50% 
Dec-99 10.06% 2.00% 2.30% 21.88% -1.34% 
-
12.69% 0.91% 13.42% 5.78% 1.33% 
Nov-99 -0.63% 
-
11.80% -6.99% -4.75% -0.14% 4.01% -2.22% 
-













11.27% 6.25% -10.03% 
Sep-99 
-






27.16% -4.88% -5.05% -2.86% -11.99% 
Aug-99 6.28% -0.14% -6.41% 
-
10.99% 0.52% -3.11% -7.57% 
-
11.72% -0.63% -1.26% 
Jul-99 -6.54% 3.13% -2.27% -2.35% 8.77% -0.27% 
-
11.13% -4.41% -3.20% 0.37% 
Jun-99 -7.88% 4.61% 4.75% 4.94% -1.85% 3.58% -1.90% 1.76% 5.44% 1.81% 
May-99 -6.10% 3.54% -6.41% 1.89% 5.67% -3.11% 0.90% 3.82% -2.50% -0.71% 
Apr-99 14.07% 19.49% 9.34% 15.85% 6.79% 19.83% 5.54% 5.39% 3.79% 15.67% 
Mar-99 0.17% -4.56% 6.31% 0.55% -3.91% 9.71% 7.87% -1.89% 3.88% 1.90% 
Feb-99 6.91% 2.70% 3.53% 0.55% 9.32% -4.47% 6.36% -9.76% -3.23% 2.41% 
Jan-99 
-









19.69% 1.29% -5.44% 
-
10.00% -3.84% -0.13% 8.20% 5.64% -10.68% 
Nov-98 -6.85% 8.15% -2.10% 5.38% 1.88% -5.04% 8.43% 8.84% 5.91% 0.40% 
Oct-98 10.48% 9.47% 18.41% 9.71% 9.25% 8.11% 8.35% 5.66% 8.03% 10.23% 




















21.45% -6.45% 6.35% 2.87% -1.16% -9.62% 
Jun-98 -5.68% -6.68% 4.64% -3.17% -3.79% 8.11% 16.07% -1.94% 3.94% -1.43% 
May-98 0.79% -4.62% 4.10% -4.76% 1.42% -3.53%  0.88% -1.88% -1.70% 
Apr-98 -1.00% -3.96% -1.01% 5.39% -1.63% -2.89%  1.89% 0.91% -2.09% 
Mar-98 -3.59% -3.92% -1.15% 3.03% 
-
22.71% -0.74%  -0.10% 4.99% -5.46% 
Feb-98 12.13% 13.91% 0.72% 18.18% 13.35% 12.83%  5.68% 7.04% 12.57% 
Jan-98 5.65% -2.68% -0.14% 1.21% 6.63% 3.22%  6.61% 1.02% 2.09% 
Dec-97 0.90% -7.88% -0.29% -6.88% 2.11% -9.72%  -6.20% 1.57% -4.31% 





11.83% -7.13% -1.52% -9.99% -8.25%  -7.66% -3.45% -9.79% 
Sep-97 2.83% -0.11% 9.70% 7.42% 3.68% 7.50%  -0.19% 5.32% 3.55% 
Aug-97 -2.53% -7.14% -9.75% -6.78% 1.68% -1.57%  23.86% -5.75% -3.75% 
Jul-97 2.72% 10.60% 18.00% 4.33% 31.10% 9.56%  -5.23% 7.81% 12.35% 
Jun-97 10.61% 0.71% 0.17% 0.73% 3.77% 6.81%  14.29% 4.35% 4.25% 
May-97 4.61% 6.84% 5.09% 7.84% 1.35% 9.14%  14.93% 5.86% 6.11% 
Apr-97 6.55% 0.00% 5.36% 8.87% 10.41% -3.05%  -0.59% 5.84% 2.85% 
Mar-97 -5.08% -3.07% 0.56% -9.85% 4.85% -4.24%  -3.44% -4.26% -2.69% 
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Feb-97 -3.80% -5.02% -4.78% -0.91% -7.97% 2.72%  -9.82% 0.59% -3.44% 
Jan-97 0.55% 0.59% -0.18% 1.23% -5.29% -4.68%  
-
12.05% 6.13% -1.21% 
Dec-96 0.97% 7.17% -4.07% -9.75% -0.45% -5.87%  2.56% -2.15% 1.09% 
Nov-96 1.12% 4.19% 7.47% 5.90% 2.94% 3.81%  9.72% 7.34% 3.73% 
Oct-96 -0.55% 0.93% -0.36% -6.09% 0.62% 
-
11.46%  -5.78% 2.61% -2.38% 
Sep-96 7.13% 4.42% 7.41% 20.33% 11.85% 8.01%  0.48% 5.42% 7.63% 
Aug-96 1.28% 2.26% 0.20% 3.45% 4.36% 6.19%  8.68% 1.88% 3.18% 
Jul-96 -1.12% 1.58% 3.23% -3.01% 0.92% -6.05%  0.80% -4.57% -0.76% 
Jun-96 0.15% 2.20% 0.61% -5.68% 8.78% -3.05%  -1.82% 0.23% 0.93% 
May-96 4.03% 3.81% -2.38% -0.31% 1.21% 5.19%  1.86% 2.29% 3.30% 
Apr-96 6.26% -5.19% 7.91% 0.00% -2.75% -1.22%  -2.58% 1.34% -0.75% 
Mar-96 -0.49% 6.78% -1.89% 4.43% 3.04% 2.24%  -3.25% 0.79% 3.34% 
Feb-96 1.16% 4.68% 2.14% 3.40% -3.52% 2.04%  0.25% 0.69% 2.22% 
Jan-96 -4.59% -1.12% -1.27% 8.27% 0.00% 3.97%  -1.48% 3.26% 0.05% 
Dec-95 7.67% 7.55% -0.84% -3.03% 4.07% 6.18%  -1.22% 1.74% 5.77% 
Nov-95 7.90% 11.26% 7.67% 6.45% 7.42% 2.01%  10.21% 4.10% 7.57% 
Oct-95 1.30% -4.03% 0.91% 0.00% -5.95% 2.65%  -1.06% -0.50% -1.13% 
Sep-95 10.27% 6.64% 4.28% 10.71% 0.00% 5.10%  0.00% 4.01% 6.06% 
Aug-95 -3.18% -4.48% 7.95% 9.68% 6.80% -2.12%  5.32% -0.03% -0.58% 
Jul-95 -0.40% 6.99% 9.86% 1.17% 9.35% 6.44%  6.89% 3.18% 5.79% 
Jun-95 6.09% 6.37% 1.43% 8.06% -0.48% 0.16%  13.99% 2.13% 3.83% 
May-95 3.03% 7.05% -5.66% 6.43% 5.54% 6.53%  -0.68% 3.63% 5.14% 
Apr-95 9.22% 2.33% -1.33% 5.07% 1.53% -0.17%  -3.28% 2.80% 2.75% 
Mar-95 11.03% 16.53% -0.53% -0.56% 10.14% 3.37%  0.99% 2.73% 9.50% 
Feb-95 7.81% 3.65% 9.57% 2.88% 9.91% 5.62%  4.14% 3.61% 6.12% 
Jan-95 -0.86% -5.32% -0.86% 0.00% -3.87% 4.50%  
-
10.77% 2.43% -1.28% 
Dec-94 5.64% 4.74% 8.07% -2.53% 3.38% 1.59%  14.84% 1.23% 3.94% 
Nov-94 -4.51% 2.28% -5.01% -0.84% -7.41% -1.37%  1.80% -3.95% -1.69% 
Oct-94 3.41% 1.45% -3.14% 6.85% -3.04% -0.58%  11.65% 2.08% 0.64% 
Sep-94 
-
11.59% -4.95% -3.05% 
-
12.04% 0.56% -5.18%  -2.35% -2.69% -5.48% 
Aug-94 25.00% 1.96% 12.81% 4.37% 7.14% 3.05%  4.08% 3.76% 7.95% 
Jul-94 -3.63% -3.51% -2.14% 5.17% 13.13% 1.35%  5.60% 3.15% 0.54% 
Jun-94 2.35% -0.27% -3.54% -5.18% 4.95% 4.02%  28.18% -2.68% 1.57% 
May-94 4.07% 3.06% 4.63% -1.61% -7.52% -3.49%  0.00% 1.24% 0.22% 
Apr-94 -4.47% 1.12% -4.57% 9.71% -4.08% -0.19%  -5.73% 1.15% -0.72% 
Mar-94 -2.10% -4.81% -8.98% 3.66% -0.93% 4.23%  
-
11.93% -4.57% -1.49% 
Feb-94 1.16% 8.09% 1.22% -1.80% 3.54% -8.49%  -2.68% -3.00% 1.28% 
Jan-94 -4.95% 0.00% -0.14% 3.73% 4.01% 2.65%  -5.49% 3.25% 0.57% 
Dec-93 -2.67% 11.97% 2.50% -7.74% -1.64% 7.76%  12.32% 1.01% 5.16% 
Nov-93 1.81% 3.00% -6.01% -1.41% 9.35% 0.62%  -9.44% -1.29% 1.93% 
Oct-93 8.46% -2.28% 3.93% 0.57% -1.07% -2.01%  2.19% 1.94% 0.59% 
Sep-93 0.40% -3.15% -2.90% -7.37% -5.39% -1.00%  5.56% -1.00% -2.40% 
Aug-93 -5.77% 0.63% 5.12% 2.15% -7.48% 6.81%  -6.49% 3.44% 0.67% 
Jul-93 1.70% 6.42% 2.12% 9.41% -3.89% -4.28%  16.08% -0.53% 1.42% 
Jun-93 7.98% -6.62% -6.23% -6.85% 7.40% 11.85%  4.19% 0.08% 2.77% 
May-93 -1.61% 4.28% -1.18% -2.41% -0.32% -5.59%  5.52% 2.27% -0.51% 
Apr-93 -2.93% 8.57% -2.93% -2.86% 5.76% 4.49%  -5.73% -2.54% 3.54% 
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Mar-93 8.70% 1.82% 
-
16.56% 12.24% 9.67% 2.53%  -4.00% 1.87% 2.99% 
Feb-93 5.84% -2.48% 3.29% 
-
12.50% 4.26% 2.36%  -0.99% 1.05% 1.08% 
Jan-93 -1.55% 
-
12.15% 10.01% 0.26% -5.49% 3.41%  
-
11.79% 0.70% -2.53% 
Dec-92 13.28% 14.23% 6.83% 9.83% 19.21% 11.41%  18.04% 1.01% 13.04% 
Nov-92 8.42% -2.43% -4.90% 2.89% 11.71% 6.05%  -8.49% 3.03% 2.84% 
Oct-92 -3.41% -2.04% 19.82% 2.06% 5.13% -4.93%  0.00% 0.21% 0.71% 
Sep-92 1.60% -1.34% 11.27% 1.50% -2.01% 2.53%  35.90% 0.91% 1.61% 




11.95% -0.84%  -4.29% -2.40% -5.20% 
Jul-92 7.65% 0.31% 10.68% 1.85% 7.62% 1.99%  
-
10.44% 3.94% 3.51% 
Jun-92 -1.40% -9.12% 10.44% 
-
13.47% 5.00% -1.12%  -4.71% -1.74% -3.38% 
May-92 -3.76% -0.28% -1.15% -5.40% -4.76% -3.78%  -2.55% 0.10% -2.41% 
Apr-92 3.05% 0.28% 0.97% 16.33% 9.38% 3.50%  10.11% 2.79% 3.61% 
Mar-92 2.85% -4.62% 9.98% 10.25% -5.88% -0.14%  -2.73% -2.18% -0.65% 
Feb-92 5.72% -9.58% 1.29% 4.94% 2.00% 4.68%  -1.61% 0.96% -1.61% 
Jan-92 -7.78% 6.54% 8.14% 2.38% -4.76% 2.86%  5.68% -1.99% 2.81% 







19.91% 1.28%  -5.49% -4.39% -7.53% 
Oct-91 13.79% -2.96% 12.40% -7.40% 13.44% 0.80%  -9.90% 1.18% 2.36% 
Sep-91 -6.73% 2.01% 9.12% 1.67% 
-
16.96% -5.34%  -6.05% -1.91% -1.97% 
Aug-91 -8.06% 7.28% -5.56% -0.83% -5.88% -3.24%  -2.72% 1.96% 0.60% 
Jul-91 6.59% 1.37% 7.46% 14.56% 17.24% 5.94%  4.25% 4.49% 6.02% 
Jun-91 4.18% -6.63% 9.12% -2.47% 3.05% -5.60%  11.58% -4.79% -2.78% 
May-91 -5.63% 7.10% 1.99% 10.20% 0.51% 6.94%  11.76% 3.86% 4.76% 
Apr-91 5.66% -2.66% 12.31% -6.07% 
-
15.15% -3.21%  3.66% 0.03% -2.36% 
Mar-91 5.33% -2.59% 34.00% -3.40% 12.14% 8.44%  24.24% 2.22% 4.02% 
Feb-91 3.91% -2.28% 
-
13.04% -5.81% 20.47% 0.67%  -8.97% 6.73% 1.03% 
Jan-91 14.13% 8.82% 13.86% 13.91% 23.02% 6.95%  36.79% 4.15% 11.01% 
Dec-90 9.80% 2.54% 8.02% -1.95% 2.21% 0.90%  23.26% 2.48% 3.04% 
Nov-90 15.02% -1.12% -2.09% 14.93% 14.29% 1.46%  14.67% 5.99% 3.57% 




Table 9. Quarterly Stock Market Returns 
QUARTERLY RETURNS 
             
YEAR QUARTER LMT BA GD GR NOC RTN LLL ATK $INX Portfolio 
1991              
  1ST 23.36% 3.95% 34.82% 4.70% 55.63% 16.06% 0.00% 52.07% 13.10% 16.07% 
  2ND 4.20% -2.19% 23.43% 1.66% 
-
11.60% -1.87% 0.00% 27.00% -0.90% -0.38% 
  3RD -8.20% 10.65% 11.02% 15.40% -5.61% -2.64% 0.00% -4.52% 4.54% 4.65% 
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  4TH 13.07% -5.20% 16.18% -6.31% 17.80% 6.97% 0.00% 
-
13.07% 7.95% 3.55% 
1992              
  1ST 0.79% -7.66% 19.41% 17.57% -8.64% 7.40% 0.00% 1.34% -3.22% 0.54% 
  2ND -2.11% -9.12% 10.26% -2.54% 9.61% -1.41% 0.00% 2.85% 1.15% -2.18% 
  3RD 7.93% -7.90% 18.79% 
-
10.13% -6.34% 3.68% 0.00% 21.16% 2.45% -0.07% 
  4TH 18.30% 9.76% 21.75% 14.79% 36.05% 12.53% 0.00% 9.55% 4.25% 16.59% 
1993              
  1ST 13.00% 
-
12.81% -3.26% 0.00% 8.43% 8.31% 0.00% 
-
16.78% 3.62% 1.53% 




12.11% 12.84% 10.75% 0.00% 3.98% -0.19% 5.81% 
  3RD -3.67% 3.90% 4.35% 4.19% 
-
16.76% 1.54% 0.00% 15.14% 1.91% -0.30% 
  4TH 7.61% 12.69% 0.43% -8.58% 6.64% 6.36% 0.00% 5.07% 1.66% 7.68% 
1994              
  1ST -5.88% 3.28% -7.90% 5.59% 6.62% -1.60% 0.00% 
-
20.09% -4.33% 0.36% 
  2ND 1.95% 3.91% -3.48% 2.92% -6.64% 0.33% 0.00% 22.45% -0.29% 1.07% 
  3RD 9.78% -6.50% 7.62% -2.50% 20.83% -0.78% 0.00% 7.33% 4.22% 3.01% 
  4TH 4.53% 8.46% -0.08% 3.48% -7.06% -0.37% 0.00% 28.29% -0.64% 2.89% 
1995              
  1ST 17.98% 14.86% 8.17% 2.32% 16.18% 13.49% 0.00% -5.64% 8.77% 14.34% 
  2ND 18.34% 15.74% -5.56% 19.57% 6.60% 6.52% 0.00% 10.04% 8.56% 11.72% 
  3RD 6.69% 9.15% 22.08% 21.56% 16.15% 9.42% 0.00% 12.21% 7.16% 11.28% 
  4TH 16.87% 14.78% 7.75% 3.42% 5.53% 10.83% 0.00% 7.93% 5.35% 12.21% 
1996              
  1ST -3.92% 10.34% -1.01% 16.10% -0.48% 8.25% 0.00% -4.48% 4.75% 5.61% 
  2ND 10.44% 0.81% 6.14% -5.99% 7.24% 0.91% 0.00% -2.55% 3.85% 3.48% 
  3RD 7.30% 8.26% 10.83% 20.77% 17.13% 8.14% 0.00% 9.96% 2.73% 10.05% 
  4TH 1.53% 12.29% 3.04% -9.94% 3.11% 
-
13.52% 0.00% 6.50% 7.80% 2.44% 
1997              
  1ST -8.34% -7.50% -4.40% -9.53% -8.41% -6.19% 0.00% 
-
25.30% 2.46% -7.34% 
  2ND 21.77% 7.56% 10.62% 17.44% 15.53% 12.90% 0.00% 28.62% 16.04% 13.21% 
  3RD 3.02% 3.35% 17.96% 4.97% 36.47% 15.49% 0.00% 18.44% 7.38% 12.15% 




13.97% 2.58% -8.33% 
1998              
  1ST 14.19% 7.31% -0.57% 22.41% -2.72% 15.30% 0.00% 12.19% 13.05% 9.20% 
  2ND -5.89% 
-
15.25% 7.73% -2.55% -4.00% 1.70% 16.07% 0.83% 2.97% -5.23% 






28.03% -5.74% 22.00% 4.68% -9.50% -11.56% 
  4TH 
-
14.68% -2.07% 17.59% 9.66% 1.13% -0.76% 16.64% 22.70% 19.58% -0.05% 
1999              
  1ST -9.73% 4.46% 8.78% -4.30% 
-
16.64% 10.29% 0.81% -5.21% 4.75% 1.87% 
  2ND 0.09% 27.63% 7.69% 22.67% 10.60% 20.30% 4.53% 10.97% 6.74% 16.76% 
  3RD 
-








21.17% -6.69% -12.88% 








49.74% 10.44% -8.52% 13.94% -14.11% 
2000              
  1ST -3.97% -7.23% -3.86% 6.50% -0.05% - 24.47% -3.68% 2.57% -6.47% 
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37.08% 
  2ND 21.47% 10.42% 7.02% 18.44% 28.46% 12.77% 9.67% 15.07% -2.88% 15.54% 
  3RD 30.29% 46.88% 19.33% 15.16% 33.55% 42.90% -0.92% 20.43% -0.91% 36.68% 
  4TH 3.55% 2.54% 22.78% -6.98% -8.75% 11.37% 33.86% 20.62% -8.10% 5.86% 
2001              




20.92% 6.18% 5.42% -3.87% 2.68% 30.60% 
-
12.19% -6.76% 
  2ND 4.29% 1.10% 23.80% -0.37% -7.67% -9.49% -1.38% 1.89% 5.69% 2.31% 




55.50% 25.54% 31.99% 18.05% 38.64% 
-
15.66% 2.74% 
  4TH 7.19% 15.47% -9.93% 32.98% 0.27% -6.50% 3.26% -9.79% 10.08% 4.46% 
2002              
  1ST 22.07% 22.81% 17.31% 17.80% 12.23% 25.06% 23.02% 29.41% 0.04% 20.79% 
  2ND 19.89% -6.43% 12.67% 
-
12.68% 10.31% -0.27% -1.57% -5.42% 
-
14.30% 5.76% 








28.91% -0.75% 8.86% 
-
18.41% -14.63% 




15.27% -9.37% 8.32% -6.49% 
2003              










11.95% -7.39% -8.42% 
-
12.14% -3.61% -18.79% 
  2ND 0.48% 33.19% 28.86% 44.86% 0.61% 15.05% 8.49% -3.73% 14.33% 16.34% 
  3RD -2.01% 1.21% 8.62% 15.82% 0.71% 
-
14.75% 1.60% -7.13% 2.22% 0.12% 
  4TH 11.43% 21.63% 15.62% 21.47% 10.51% 7.62% 17.89% 19.50% 11.29% 15.39% 
2004              
  1ST 
-
11.60% -2.35% -1.12% -5.32% 3.05% 4.30% 15.34% -5.81% 1.31% -1.24% 
  2ND 13.50% 22.78% 10.79% 15.27% 8.89% 13.58% 11.84% 15.71% 1.33% 15.29% 
  3RD 6.96% 1.08% 2.89% -3.02% -0.60% 6.67% 0.94% -4.15% -2.26% 2.74% 
  4TH 0.51% 0.66% 2.66% 4.10% 2.39% 2.89% 9.69% 8.86% 8.51% 2.29% 
2005              
  1ST 9.61% 12.73% 2.36% 16.45% -0.55% -0.23% -3.03% 9.02% -2.55% 6.52% 
  2ND 6.25% 12.46% 2.37% 6.97% 2.35% 1.20% 7.86% -1.07% 0.97% 6.75% 
Source: Thesis Author 
 
 
Table 10. Sample Group Average Quarterly Stock Market Return 
SAMPLE GROUP AVERAGE QUARTERLY AND YEARLY 
RETURN 
  YEAR QUARTER   
ANNUAL 
RETURN   
  1991   34.60%   
   1ST 23.82%    
   2ND 5.08%    
   3RD 2.01%    
   4TH 3.68%    
  1992   23.46%   
   1ST 3.78%    
   2ND 0.94%    
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   3RD 3.40%    
   4TH 15.34%    
  1993   6.32%   
   1ST -0.39%    
   2ND 1.85%    
   3RD 1.09%    
   4TH 3.78%    
  1994   9.31%   
   1ST -2.50%    
   2ND 2.68%    
   3RD 4.47%    
   4TH 4.66%    
  1995   37.87%   
   1ST 8.42%    
   2ND 8.91%    
   3RD 12.16%    
   4TH 8.39%    
  1996   15.90%   
   1ST 3.10%    
   2ND 2.13%    
   3RD 10.30%    
   4TH 0.38%    
  1997   10.69%   
   1ST -8.71%    
   2ND 14.30%    
   3RD 12.46%    
   4TH -7.37%    
  1998   7.80%   
   1ST 8.52%    
   2ND -0.17%    
   3RD -6.83%    
   4TH 6.28%    
  1999   -19.48%   
   1ST -1.44%    
   2ND 13.06%    
   3RD -17.20%    
   4TH -13.90%    
  2000   48.13%   
   1ST -3.11%    
   2ND 15.41%    
   3RD 25.95%    
   4TH 9.87%    
  2001   12.84%   
   1ST 1.24%    
   2ND 1.52%    
   3RD 5.95%    
   4TH 4.12%    
  2002   2.56%   
   1ST 21.21%    
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   2ND 2.06%    
   3RD -13.88%    
   4TH -6.83%    
  2003   14.27%   
   1ST -17.93%    
   2ND 15.98%    
   3RD 0.51%    
   4TH 15.71%    
  2004   18.92%   
   1ST -0.44%    
   2ND 14.04%    
   3RD 1.34%    
   4TH 3.97%    
  2005   10.59%   
   1ST 5.79%    
   2ND 4.80%    
   3RD     
   4TH     
 
 
Table 11. Annual Stock Market Returns from 1990 – 2005 
ANNUAL RETURNS 
YEAR LMT BA GD GR NOC RTN LLL ATK $INX Portfolio 
2005 9.88% 28.12% 13.69% 31.77% 0.21% -1.83% 8.83% 13.77% 1.59% 14.71% 
2004 9.36% 22.18% 15.21% 11.02% 13.73% 27.44% 37.81% 14.60% 8.88% 19.08% 












16.70% 23.56% 12.13% 22.61% 61.33% 
-
12.07% 2.76% 
2000 51.34% 52.61% 45.27% 33.13% 53.21% 29.96% 67.08% 52.44% -9.32% 51.60% 
1999 
-








23.93% 18.75% -8.35% 
1998 -9.26% 
-
32.29% 32.69% -0.77% 
-
33.62% 10.49% 54.71% 40.41% 26.10% -7.63% 
1997 9.20% -5.63% 23.67% 4.34% 38.80% 7.35% 0.00% 7.78% 28.47% 9.69% 
1996 15.34% 31.70% 18.99% 20.94% 27.01% 3.78% 0.00% 9.43% 19.13% 21.58% 
1995 59.89% 54.53% 32.44% 46.87% 44.46% 40.26% 0.00% 24.54% 29.83% 49.54% 
1994 10.38% 9.15% -3.83% 9.49% 13.74% -2.41% 0.00% 37.98% -1.03% 7.33% 
1993 20.37% 10.00% -8.82% 
-
16.50% 11.16% 26.95% 0.00% 7.42% 7.00% 14.72% 
1992 24.91% 
-
14.91% 70.22% 19.69% 30.68% 22.20% 0.00% 34.90% 4.63% 14.87% 
1991 32.43% 7.21% 85.45% 15.45% 56.22% 18.52% 0.00% 61.49% 24.69% 23.89% 





Table 12. Sample Group Growth in Operations as a Result of M & A Activity 
INCOME GROWTH 
AVERAGE NET INCOME GROWTH 1- YEAR PRIOR 
TO TRANSACTION 30.33% 
AVERAGE NET INCOME GROWTH 1-YEAR AFTER 
TRANSACTION 17.40% 
AVERAGE NET INCOME GROWTH IN THE 
SECOND YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION -22.80% 
AVERAGE TOTAL NET INCOME GROWTH 
COMPARING THE TRANSACTION YEAR TO THE 
SECOND YEAR AFTER THE TRANSACTION 19.74% 
  
CASH FLOW GROWTH 
AVERAGE NET CASH FLOW GROWTH 1-YEAR 
PRIOR TO TRANSACTION 52.33% 
AVERAGE NET CASH FLOW GROWTH 1-YEAR 
AFTER TRANSACTION 25.04% 
AVERAGE NET CASH FLOW GROWTH IN THE 
SECOND YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION -2.40% 
AVERAGE TOTAL NET CASH FLOW GROWTH 
COMPARING THE TRANSACTION YEAR TO THE 
SECOND YEAR AFTER THE TRANSACTION 14.70% 
  
SALES GROWTH 
AVERAGE NET SALES GROWTH 1-YEAR PRIOR 
TO TRANSACTION 23.65% 
AVERAGE NET SALES GROWTH 1-YEAR AFTER 
TRANSACTION 22.24% 
AVERAGE NET SALES GROWTH IN THE SECOND 
YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION 14.90% 
AVERAGE TOTAL NET SALES GROWTH 
COMPARING THE TRANSACTION YEAR TO THE 
SECOND YEAR AFTER THE TRANSACTION 40.36% 
  
EBITDA GROWTH 
AVERAGE EBITDA GROWTH 1-YEAR PRIOR TO 
TRANSACTION 30.56% 
AVERAGE EBITDA GROWTH 1-YEAR AFTER 
TRANSACTION 30.77% 
AVERAGE EBITDA GROWTH IN THE SECOND 
YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION 126.89% 
AVERAGE TOTAL EBITDA GROWTH COMPARING 
THE TRANSACTION YEAR TO THE SECOND 
YEAR AFTER THE TRANSACTION 33.66% 
  
SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY GROWTH 
AVERAGE SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY GROWTH 1-
YEAR PRIOR TO TRANSACTION 30.67% 
AVERAGE SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY GROWTH 1-
YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION 20.66% 
AVERAGE SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY GROWTH IN 
THE SECOND YEAR AFTER TRANSACTION 16.57% 
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AVERAGE TOTAL SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY 
GROWTH COMPARING THE TRANSACTION YEAR 
TO THE SECOND YEAR AFTER THE 
TRANSACTION 40.28% 
Sample Average Growth Rates 
Year-Over-Year Net Earnings/ Net Income/Income 
from Continuing Operations/ Total Sources of 
Cash from Continuing Operations Growth 10.54% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities 26.94% 
Sales/Net Sales/Total Sales/Sales and Other 
Activities/Product Sales 20.65% 
EBITDA/Operations Before Interest and Income 
Tax 58.16% 



































Table 13. Defense Industry Financial Performance 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Lockheed Martin (LMT) 
Results of FY1993 Transactions 
       
 1992 1993 1994 1995 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1992 to 1993  30.43% 
Net Earnings  $               345   $               450  $              1,055   $               682  % Change from 1993 to 1994  134.44% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $               678   $               640  $              1,493   $             1,292 % Change from 1994 to 1995 -35.36% 
     % Change from 1993 compared to 1995 51.56% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $            5,954   $            9,436  $          22,906   $         22,853  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $                512  $               725  $              1,675   $             1,089 % Change from 1992 to 1993  -5.60% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994  133.28% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1994 to 1995 -13.46% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             1,945  $            2,877  $             6,086   $            6,433  % Change from 1993 compared to 1995 101.88% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 24.91% 20.37% 10.38% 59.89% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 23.46% 6.32% 9.31% 37.87% % Change from 1992 to 1993  58.48% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994  142.75% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 -0.23% 
     % Change from 1993 compared to 1995 142.19% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993  41.60% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994  131.03% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 -34.99% 
     % Change from 1993 compared to 1995 50.21% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993  47.92% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994  111.54% 
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     % Change from 1994 to 1995 5.70% 
     % Change from 1993 compared to 1995 123.60% 
       
Results of FY1996 Transactions 
       
 1995 1996 1997 1998 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1995 to 1996 97.51% 
Net Earnings  $               682  $             1,347  $              1,300   $              1,001 % Change from 1996 to 1997 -3.49% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $             1,292  $            1,636  $              1,208   $             2,031 % Change from 1997 to 1998 -23.00% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 -25.69% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $         22,853   $         26,875  $          28,069   $         26,266  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $             1,089  $            2,033  $              1,937   $              1,661 % Change from 1995 to 1996 26.63% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -26.16% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1997 to 1998 68.13% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            6,433   $            6,856  $              5,176   $             6,137 % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 24.14% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 59.89% 15.34% 9.20% -9.26% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 37.87% 15.90% 10.69% 7.80% % Change from 1995 to 1996 17.60% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 4.44% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 -6.42% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 -2.27% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 86.69% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -4.72% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 -14.25% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 -18.30% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 6.58% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -24.50% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 18.57% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 -10.49% 
 65
       
Results of FY1997 Transactions 
       
 1996 1997 1998 1999 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -3.49% 
Net Earnings  $             1,347 $             1,300  $               1,001  $               737  % Change from 1997 to 1998 -23.00% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $             1,636 $             1,208  $              2,031   $             1,077 % Change from 1998 to 1999 -26.37% 
     % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 -43.31% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $         26,875   $         28,069  $          26,266   $         25,530  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $            2,033  $             1,937  $               1,661  $             1,200 % Change from 1996 to 1997 -26.16% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 68.13% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1998 to 1999 -46.97% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            6,856  $             5,176  $              6,137   $             6,361 % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 -10.84% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 15.34% 9.20% -9.26% -50.93% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 15.90% 10.69% 7.80% -19.48% % Change from 1996 to 1997 4.44% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 -6.42% 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 -2.80% 
     % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 -9.05% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -4.72% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 -14.25% 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 -27.75% 
     % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 -38.05% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -24.50% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 18.57% 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 3.65% 
     % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 22.89% 




Results of FY1999 Transactions 
       
 1998 1999 2000 2001 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1998 to 1999 -26.37% 
Net Earnings  $              1,001  $               737  $              (424)  $                  79 % Change from 1999 to 2000 -157.53% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $             2,031 $             1,077  $              2,016   $             1,825 % Change from 2000 to 2001 -118.63% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 -89.28% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $         26,266   $         25,530  $          25,329   $         23,990  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $              1,661 $             1,200  $                286   $                188 % Change from 1998 to 1999 -46.97% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 87.19% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -9.47% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             6,137 $             6,361  $              7,160   $            6,443  % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 69.45% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -9.26% -50.93% 51.34% 34.12% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 7.80% -19.48% 48.13% 12.84% % Change from 1998 to 1999 -2.80% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 -0.79% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -5.29% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 -6.03% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 -27.75% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 -76.17% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -34.27% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 -84.33% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 3.65% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 12.56% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -10.01% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 1.29% 





Results of FY2003 Transactions 
       
 2002 2003 2004  Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 97.56% 
Net Earnings  $               533  $             1,053  $              1,266   % Change from 2003 to 2004 20.23% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $            2,288  $             1,809  $             2,924     
     
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -20.94% 
Net Sales  $         26,578   $          31,824  $          35,526   % Change from 2003 to 2004 61.64% 
EBITDA  $               577  $             1,532  $              1,644     
     Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 19.74% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            5,865   $            6,756  $              7,021   % Change from 2003 to 2004 11.63% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 25.43% -8.13% 9.36%  Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 2.56% 14.27% 18.92%  % Change from 2002 to 2003 165.51% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 7.31% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 15.19% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 3.92% 
       
       
Boeing Co (BA) 
Results of FY1996 Transactions 
       
 1995 1996 1997 1998 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1995 to 1996 178.63% 
Net Earnings  $               393   $             1,095  $               (178)  $              1,120 % Change from 1996 to 1997 -116.26% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $             1,066  $            2,223  $              2,100   $            2,367  % Change from 1997 to 1998 -729.21% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 2.28% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Sales and Other Operating Revenues  $           19,515  $          22,681  $          45,800   $          56,154  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
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EBITDA  $                 511 $              1,641  $                   73   $             1,850 % Change from 1995 to 1996 108.54% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -5.53% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1997 to 1998 12.71% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            9,898  $           10,941  $           12,953   $           12,316 % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 6.48% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 54.53% 31.70% -5.63% -32.29% Growth (Decrease) in Sales and Other Activities 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 37.87% 15.90% 10.69% 7.80% % Change from 1995 to 1996 16.22% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 101.93% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 22.61% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 147.58% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 221.14% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -95.55% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 2434.25%
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 12.74% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 10.54% 
     % Change from 1996 to 1997 18.39% 
     % Change from 1997 to 1998 -4.92% 
     % Change from 1996 compared to 1998 12.57% 
       
       
General Dynamics (GD) 
Results of FY1999 Transactions 
       
 1998 1999 2000 2001 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1998 to 1999 141.76% 
Net Earnings  $               364   $               880  $                 901   $               943  % Change from 1999 to 2000 2.39% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $               370  $              1,016  $               1,071  $              1,103 % Change from 2000 to 2001 4.66% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 7.16% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $            4,970   $            8,959  $           10,356   $           12,163 
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
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EBITDA  $               549  $              1,126  $              1,262   $             1,424 % Change from 1998 to 1999 174.59% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 5.41% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2000 to 2001 2.99% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             2,219 $              3,171  $             3,820   $            4,528  % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 8.56% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 32.69% -9.00% 45.27% 6.37% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 7.80% -19.48% 48.13% 12.84% % Change from 1998 to 1999 80.26% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 15.59% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 17.45% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 35.76% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 105.10% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 12.08% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 12.84% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 26.47% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 42.90% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 20.47% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 18.53% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 42.79% 
       
Results of FY2000 Transactions 
       
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1999 to 2000 2.39% 
Net Earnings  $               880  $                901  $                943   $              1,051 % Change from 2000 to 2001 4.66% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $              1,016 $              1,071  $               1,103  $              1,125 % Change from 2001 to 2002 11.45% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 16.65% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $            8,959   $          10,356  $            12,163   $          13,829  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $              1,126 $             1,262  $              1,424   $             1,584 % Change from 1999 to 2000 5.41% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 2.99% 
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Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 1.99% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $              3,171  $            3,820  $             4,528   $             5,199 % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 5.04% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -9.00% 45.27% 6.37% 4.35% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain -19.48% 48.13% 12.84% 2.56% % Change from 1999 to 2000 15.59% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 17.45% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 13.70% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 33.54% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 12.08% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 12.84% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 11.24% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 25.52% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 20.47% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 18.53% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 14.82% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 36.10% 
       
Results of FY2001 Transactions 
       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2000 to 2001 4.66% 
Net Earnings  $                901  $               943  $               1,051  $               997  % Change from 2001 to 2002 11.45% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $              1,071 $              1,103  $               1,125  $             1,723 % Change from 2002 to 2003 -5.14% 
     % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 5.73% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $          10,356  $           12,163  $           13,829   $           16,617 
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $             1,262 $             1,424  $              1,584   $             1,372 % Change from 1999 to 2000 2.99% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 1.99% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 53.16% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            3,820   $            4,528  $              5,199   $             5,921 % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 56.21% 
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Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 45.27% 6.37% 4.35% 18.96% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 48.13% 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% % Change from 1999 to 2000 17.45% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 13.70% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 20.16% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 36.62% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 12.84% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 11.24% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 -13.38% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 -3.65% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 18.53% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 14.82% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 13.89% 
     % Change from 2000 compared to 2002 30.76% 
       
Results of FY2002 Transactions 
       
 2001 2002 2003 2004 Net Earnings Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 11.45% 
Net Earnings  $               943   $             1,051  $                997   $             1,203 % Change from 2002 to 2003 -5.14% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $              1,103 $              1,125  $              1,723   $             1,802 % Change from 2003 to 2004 20.66% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 14.46% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net Sales  $           12,163  $          13,829  $            16,617   $           19,178 
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $             1,424 $             1,584  $              1,372   $             1,785 % Change from 2001 to 2002 1.99% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 53.16% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 4.59% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            4,528  $             5,199  $              5,921   $             7,189 % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 60.18% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 6.37% 4.35% 18.96% 15.21% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
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Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% % Change from 2001 to 2002 13.70% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 20.16% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 15.41% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 38.68% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 11.24% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -13.38% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 30.10% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 12.69% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 14.82% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 13.89% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 21.42% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 38.28% 
       
       
Goodrich Corp (GR) 
Results of FY2002 Transactions 
       
 2001 2002 2003 2004 Growth (Decline) in Income from Continuing Operations  
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 -7.63% 
Income from Continuing Operations  $             179.6 $             165.9  $               38.5   $             156.0 % Change from 2002 to 2003 -76.79% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $            382.6   $            539.2  $              553.1   $             415.6 % Change from 2003 to 2004 305.19% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 -5.97% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Sales  $         4,184.5   $         3,910.2  $         4,382.9   $        4,724.5  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $             281.7  $            269.6  $               69.2   $             199.3 % Change from 2001 to 2002 40.93% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 2.58% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 -24.86% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $          1,361.4  $            932.9  $           1,193.5   $         1,342.9  % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 -22.92% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -16.70% -27.79% 56.88% 11.02% Growth (Decrease) in Sales 
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Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% % Change from 2001 to 2002 -6.56% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 12.09% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 7.79% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 20.83% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 -4.30% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -74.33% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 188.01% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 -26.08% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 -31.47% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 27.93% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 12.52% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 43.95% 
       
Results of FY2003 Transactions 
       
 2002 2003 2004  Growth (Decline) in Income from Continuing Operations 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -76.79% 
Income from Continuing Operations  $             165.9  $              38.5  $              156.0   % Change from 2003 to 2004 305.19% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $            539.2  $             553.1  $              415.6     
     
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 2.58% 
Sales  $         3,910.2   $        4,382.9  $         4,724.5   % Change from 2003 to 2004 -24.86% 
EBITDA  $            269.6   $              69.2  $               119.3    
     Growth (Decrease) in Sales 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 12.09% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            932.9  $          1,193.5  $          1,342.9   % Change from 2003 to 2004 7.79% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -27.79% 56.88% 11.02%  Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 2.56% 14.27% 18.92%  % Change from 2002 to 2003 -74.33% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 72.40% 
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     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 27.93% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 12.52% 
       
       
Northrop Grumman (NOC) 
Results of FY1994 Transactions 
       
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
 Growth (Decrease) in Total Sources of Cash from 
Continuing Operations 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1993 to 1994 49.37% 
Total Sources of Cash from Continuing
Operations  $            4,963  $             7,413  $             6,700   $            8,077  % Change from 1994 to 1995 -9.62% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $               380  $                441  $                744   $                701 % Change from 1995 to 1996 20.55% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 8.96% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Product Sales  $            5,063  $              6,711  $              6,818   $             8,071 
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Continuing Operations 
Before Income Taxes  $                170 $                  65  $                409   $               384  % Change from 1993 to 1994 16.05% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 68.71% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -5.78% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             1,322 $             1,290  $              1,459   $             2,128 % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 58.96% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 11.16% 13.74% 44.46% 27.01% Growth (Decrease) in Product Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 6.32% 9.31% 37.87% 15.90% % Change from 1993 to 1994 32.55% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 1.59% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 18.38% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 20.27% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -61.76% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 529.23% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -6.11% 
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     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 490.77% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -2.42% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 13.10% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 45.85% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 64.96% 
       
Results of FY1999 Transactions 
       
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Growth (Decrease) in Total Sources of Cash from 
Continuing Operations 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1998 to 1999 4.82% 
Total Sources of Cash from Continuing
Operations  $             8,816 $             9,241  $             8,483   $          14,534  % Change from 1999 to 2000 -8.20% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $               244  $             1,207  $               1,010  $                817 % Change from 2000 to 2001 71.33% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 57.28% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net/Product Sales  $            8,902   $            8,995  $              6,133   $          10,664  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Continuing Operations 
Before Income Taxes  $                312  $               762  $                975   $               699  % Change from 1998 to 1999 394.67% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 -16.32% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -19.11% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $            2,850   $            3,257  $              3,919   $             7,391 % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 -32.31% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -33.62% -24.23% 53.21% 23.56% Growth (Decrease) in Product Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 7.80% -19.48% 48.13% 12.84% % Change from 1998 to 1999 1.04% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 -31.82% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 73.88% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 18.55% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 144.23% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 27.95% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -28.31% 
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     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 -8.27% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1998 to 1999 14.28% 
     % Change from 1999 to 2000 20.33% 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 88.59% 
     % Change from 1999 compared to 2001 126.93% 
       
Results of FY2001 Transactions 
       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Growth (Decrease) in Total Sources of Cash from 
Continuing Operations 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2000 to 2001 71.33% 
Total Sources of Cash from Continuing
Operations  $            8,483   $          14,534  $           18,467   $         26,576  % Change from 2001 to 2002 27.06% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $              1,010 $                817  $              1,689   $               798  % Change from 2002 to 2003 43.91% 
     % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 82.85% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net/Product Sales  $             6,133  $          10,664  $           13,638   $          18,350  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Continuing Operations 
Before Income Taxes  $               975   $               699  $              1,009  $               1,131 % Change from 2000 to 2001 -19.11% 
  $               1,131 $             1,009  $                699   $               975  % Change from 2001 to 2002 106.73% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -52.75% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             3,919 $             7,391  $           14,322   $          15,785  % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 -2.33% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 53.21% 23.56% 0.25% -0.12% Growth (Decrease) in Product Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 48.13% 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% % Change from 2000 to 2001 73.88% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 27.89% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 34.55% 
     % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 72.07% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 -28.31% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 44.35% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 12.09% 
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     % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 61.80% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2000 to 2001 88.59% 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 93.78% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 10.22% 
     % Change from 2001 compared to 2003 113.57% 
       
Results of FY2002 Transactions 
       
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 Growth (Decrease) in Total Sources of Cash from 
Continuing Operations 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 27.06% 
Total Sources of Cash from Continuing 
Operations  $          14,534   $          18,467  $          26,576   $         29,856  % Change from 2002 to 2003 43.91% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $                817 $             1,689  $                798   $             1,936 % Change from 2003 to 2004 12.34% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 61.67% 
Income Statement ($'s in Millions)       
Net/Product Sales  $          10,664   $          13,638  $           18,350   $          20,106  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Continuing Operations
Before Income Taxes  $               699  $             1,009 $                1,131  $              1,615 % Change from 2001 to 2002 106.73% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -52.75% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 142.61% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $             7,391  $          14,322  $           15,785   $          16,700  % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 14.62% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 23.56% 0.25% -0.12% 13.73% Growth (Decrease) in Product Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% % Change from 2001 to 2002 27.89% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 34.55% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 9.57% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 47.43% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 44.35% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 12.09% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 42.79% 
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     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 60.06% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 93.78% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 10.22% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 5.80% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 16.60% 
       
       
Raytheon Co (RTN) 
Results of FY1992 Transactions 
       
 1991 1992 1993 1994 Net Income Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1991 to 1992 7.32% 
Net Income (Loss)  $        591,762   $       635,073  $         692,991   $       596,876  % Change from 1992 to 1993 9.12% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $       748,574   $        691,525  $        950,057   $     1,088,618  % Change from 1993 to 1994 -13.87% 
     % Change from 1992 compared to 1994 -6.01% 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Net Sales  $   9,274,235   $    9,058,216  $      9,201,197   $   10,012,855  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $       872,742   $       955,967  $     1,047,347   $       899,939  % Change from 1991 to 1992 -7.62% 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993 37.39% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 1993 to 1994 14.58% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $   3,323,404   $   3,843,234   $    4,297,860   $    3,928,168  % Change from 1992 compared to 1994 57.42% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 18.52% 22.20% 26.95% -2.41% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 34.60% 23.46% 6.32% 9.31% % Change from 1991 to 1992 -2.33% 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993 1.58% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 8.82% 
     % Change from 1992 compared to 1994 10.54% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1991 to 1992 9.54% 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993 9.56% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -14.07% 
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     % Change from 1992 compared to 1994 -5.86% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1991 to 1992 15.64% 
     % Change from 1992 to 1993 11.83% 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -8.60% 
     % Change from 1992 compared to 1994 2.21% 
       
Results of FY1994 Transactions 
       
 1993 1994 1995 1996 Net Income Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -13.87% 
Net Income (Loss)  $        692,991   $       596,876  $        792,488   $          761,151 % Change from 1994 to 1995 32.77% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $       950,057   $     1,088,618  $       1,134,169   $         291,195 % Change from 1995 to 1996 -3.95% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 27.52% 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Net Sales  $     9,201,197   $   10,012,855  $     11,715,597   $  12,330,538  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $    1,047,347   $       899,939  $       1,191,683   $    1,083,462  % Change from 1993 to 1994 14.58% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 4.18% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -74.33% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $   4,297,860   $    3,928,168  $     4,291,964   $    4,598,010  % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 -73.25% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 26.95% -2.41% 40.26% 3.78% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 6.32% 9.31% 37.87% 15.90% % Change from 1993 to 1994 8.82% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 17.01% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 5.25% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 23.15% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -14.07% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 32.42% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -9.08% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 20.39% 
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     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -8.60% 
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 9.26% 
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 7.13% 
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 17.05% 
       
Results of FY1997 Transactions 
       
 1996 1997 1998 1999 Net Income Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 1996 to 1997 -30.76%
Net Income (Loss)  $          761,151  $       527,000  $        864,000   $       404,000  % Change from 1997 to 1998 63.95%
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $        291,295   $       963,000  $        820,000   $      (317,000) % Change from 1998 to 1999 -53.24%
     % Change from 1997 compared to 1999 -23.34%
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Net Sales  $  12,330,538   $  13,673,000  $   19,530,000   $   19,841,000  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $    1,083,462   $       790,000  $     1,467,000   $       828,000  % Change from 1993 to 1994 230.59%
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 -14.85%
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -138.66%
Total Shareholders' Equity  $    4,598,010   $  10,425,000  $   10,856,000   $  10,959,000  % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 -132.92%
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 3.78% 7.35% 10.49% -49.69% Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 15.90% 10.69% 7.80% -19.48% % Change from 1993 to 1994 10.89%
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 42.84%
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 1.59%
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 45.11%
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 -27.09%
     % Change from 1994 to 1995 85.70%
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 -43.56%
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 4.81%
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 1993 to 1994 126.73%
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     % Change from 1994 to 1995 4.13%
     % Change from 1995 to 1996 0.95%
     % Change from 1994 compared to 1996 5.12%
       
Results of FY2003 Transactions 
       
 2002 2003 2004  Net Income Growth (Decline) 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -29.14%
Net Income (Loss)  $       755,000   $       535,000  $        439,000   % Change from 2003 to 2004 -17.94%
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $    1,039,000   $    1,569,000  $     2,071,000     
     
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 51.01%
Net Sales  $  16,760,000   $   18,109,000  $  20,245,000   % Change from 2003 to 2004 31.99%
EBITDA  $    1,074,000   $       762,000  $        579,000     
     Growth (Decrease) in Net Sales 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 8.05%
Total Shareholders' Equity  $   8,870,000   $    9,162,000  $    10,551,000   % Change from 2003 to 2004 11.80%
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 0.86% 0.53% 27.44%  Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 2.56% 14.27% 18.92%  % Change from 2002 to 2003 -29.05%
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 -24.02%
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 3.29%
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 15.16%
       
       
L-3 Communications Holdings (LLL) 
Results of FY2002 Transactions 
       
 2001 2002 2003 2004  Growth (Decrease) in Net Income 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 54.25% 
Net Income (Loss)  $         115,458  $        178,097  $        277,640   $        381,880  % Change from 2002 to 2003 55.89% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $        172,968   $        318,460  $        456,063   $        620,671  % Change from 2003 to 2004 37.55% 
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     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 114.42% 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Total Sales  $   2,347,422   $     4,011,229  $     5,061,594   $   6,896,997  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
EBITDA  $       275,330   $       453,979  $          581,021   $        748,619  % Change from 2001 to 2002 84.11% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 43.21% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 36.09% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $     1,213,892   $   2,202,202   $    2,574,496   $    3,799,761  % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 94.90% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 22.61% 5.44% 19.56% 37.81% Growth (Decrease) in Total Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% % Change from 2001 to 2002 70.88% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 26.19% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 36.26% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 71.94% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 64.89% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 27.98% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 28.85% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 64.90% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 81.42% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 16.91% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 47.59% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 72.54% 
       
Results of FY2003 Transactions 
       
 2002 2003 2004  Growth (Decline) in Net Income 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 55.89% 
Net Income (Loss)  $        178,097   $       277,640  $         381,880   % Change from 2003 to 2004 37.55% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $        318,460   $       456,063  $         620,671     
     
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
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Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 43.21% 
Total Sales  $     4,011,229   $    5,061,594  $    6,896,997   % Change from 2003 to 2004 36.09% 
EBITDA  $       453,979  $         581,021  $         748,619     
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Sales 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 26.19% 
Total Shareholders' Equity  $   2,202,202   $   2,574,496   $     3,799,761   % Change from 2003 to 2004 36.26% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 5.44% 19.56% 37.81%  Growth (Decrease) in EBITDA 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 2.56% 14.27% 18.92%  % Change from 2002 to 2003 27.98% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 28.85% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 16.91% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 47.59% 
       
       
Alliant Techsystems (ATK) 
Results of FY2002 Transactions 
       
 2001 2002 2003 2004  Growth (Decrease) in Net Income 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2001 to 2002 2.07% 
Net Income (Loss)  $          67,921   $         69,327  $         124,287   $        162,305  % Change from 2002 to 2003 79.28% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $         74,620   $        162,052  $         196,577   $         179,801 % Change from 2003 to 2004 30.59% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 134.12% 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Sales  $      1,141,949  $     1,801,605  $      2,172,135   $    2,366,193  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Operations Before
Interest and Income Tax  $        136,094   $       223,682  $        275,543   $       277,063  % Change from 2001 to 2002 117.17% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 21.30% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 -8.53% 
Total Stockholders' Equity  $        198,332   $        556,801  $        477,924   $       564,200  % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 10.95% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 61.33% 23.46% -3.50% 14.60% Growth (Decrease) in Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 12.84% 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% % Change from 2001 to 2002 57.77% 
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     % Change from 2002 to 2003 20.57% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 8.93% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 31.34% 
       
     
Growth (Decrease) in Income (Loss) from Operations Before 
Interest and Income Tax 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 64.36% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 23.19% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 0.55% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 23.86% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Stockholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2001 to 2002 180.74% 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -14.17% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 18.05% 
     % Change from 2002 compared to 2004 1.33% 
       
Results of FY2003 Transactions 
       
 2002 2003 2004 2005  Growth (Decrease) in Net Income 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2002 to 2003 79.28% 
Net Income (Loss)  $         69,327   $        124,287  $         162,305   $        153,540  % Change from 2003 to 2004 30.59% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $        162,052   $        196,577  $          179,801   $        196,055  % Change from 2004 to 2005 -5.40% 
     % Change from 2003 compared to 2005 23.54% 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)       
Sales  $     1,801,605   $     2,172,135  $     2,366,193   $     2,801,129  
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income (Loss) from Operations Before
Interest and Income Tax  $       223,682   $       275,543  $        277,063   $       284,992  % Change from 2002 to 2003 21.30% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 -8.53% 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2004 to 2005 9.04% 
Total Stockholders' Equity  $        556,801   $       477,924  $        564,200   $       686,359  % Change from 2003 compared to 2005 -0.27% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) 23.46% -3.50% 14.60% 13.77% Growth (Decrease) in Sales 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 2.56% 14.27% 18.92% 10.59% % Change from 2002 to 2003 20.57% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 8.93% 
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     % Change from 2004 to 2005 18.38% 
     % Change from 2003 compared to 2005 28.96% 
       
     
Growth (Decrease) in Income (Loss) from Operations Before 
Interest and Income Tax 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 23.19% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 0.55% 
     % Change from 2004 to 2005 2.86% 
     % Change from 2003 compared to 2005 3.43% 
       
     Growth (Decrease) in Total Stockholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2002 to 2003 -14.17% 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 18.05% 
     % Change from 2004 to 2005 21.65% 
     % Change from 2003 compared to 2005 43.61% 
       
Results of FY2004 Transactions 
       
 2003 2004 2005  Growth (Decline) in Net Income 
Statement of Cash Flows  ($'s in Millions)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 30.59% 
Net Income (Loss)  $        124,287   $        162,305  $         153,540   % Change from 2004 to 2005 -5.40% 
Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities  $        196,577  $         179,801  $         196,055     
     
Growth (Decrease) in Net Cash Flows from Operating 
Activities 
Income Statement ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 -8.53% 
Sales  $     2,172,135   $    2,366,193  $      2,801,129   % Change from 2004 to 2005 9.04% 
Income (Loss) from Operations Before
Interest and Income Tax  $       275,543   $       277,063  $        284,992     
     Growth (Decrease) in Sales 
Balance Sheet ($'s in Thousands)     % Change from 2003 to 2004 8.93% 
Total Stockholders' Equity  $       477,924   $       564,200  $        686,359   % Change from 2004 to 2005 18.38% 
       
Annual Capital Gain (Loss) -3.50% 14.60% 13.77%  
Growth (Decrease) in Income (Loss) from Operations Before 
Interest and Income Tax 
Sample Group Average Annual Capital Gain 14.27% 18.92% 10.59%  % Change from 2003 to 2004 0.55% 
     % Change from 2004 to 2005 2.86% 
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     Growth (Decrease) in Total Shareholders' Equity 
     % Change from 2003 to 2004 18.05% 
     % Change from 2004 to 2005 21.65% 











































































































































Lockheed Martin (LMT) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 


























































































































































Boeing Corp. (BA) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 3.   Boeing (BA) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 
 

































































































































General Dynamics Corp. (GD) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 4.   General Dynamics (GD) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 
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Goodrich Corp. (GR) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 5.   Goodrich (GR) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 
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Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 6.   Northrop Grumman (NOC) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 
 





































































































































Raytheon Company (RTN) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 7.   Raytheon (RTN) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 
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L-3 Communications (LLL) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
 
Figure 8.   L-3 Communications (LLL) Relative Price Trend from 1990 – 2005 






































































































































Alliant Techsystems (ATK) Standard & Poors 500 Index ($INX)
Source: Created by Author
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